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Abstract
This paper considers games in which multiple principals contract simultaneously with the
same agent. We introduce a new class of revelation mechanisms that, although it does not
always permit a complete equilibrium characterization, it facilitates the characterization of the
equilibrium outcomes that are typically of interest in applications (those sustained by pure-
strategy pro￿les in which the agent￿ s behavior in each relationship is Markov, i.e., it depends
only on payo⁄-relevant information such as the agent￿ s type and the decisions he is inducing
with the other principals). We then illustrate how these mechanisms can be put to work in
environments such as menu auctions, competition in nonlinear tari⁄s, and moral hazard settings.
Lastly, we show how one can enrich the revelation mechanisms, albeit at a cost of an increase
in complexity, to characterize also equilibrium outcomes sustained by non-Markov strategies
and/or mixed-strategy pro￿les.
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It is by now well understood that in environments in which multiple principals1 contract non-
cooperatively with the same agent, the Revelation Principle2 is invalid. The reason is that the
agent￿ s preferences over the decisions of one principal depend not only on his ￿type￿ (i.e. his
exogenous private information) but also on the decisions induced with the other principals.3
Two solutions have been proposed in the literature. Epstein and Peters (1999) have suggested
that the agent should communicate not only his type but also the mechanisms o⁄ered by the
other principals. However, describing a mechanism requires an appropriate language. The main
contribution of Epstein and Peters is in proving existence of a universal language that is rich
enough to describe all possible mechanisms. This language also permits them to identify a class
of universal mechanisms with the property that any indirect mechanism can be embedded into it.
Since universal mechanisms have the agent truthfully report all his private information, they can
be considered direct revelation mechanisms and therefore a universal Revelation Principle holds.
Although a remarkable contribution, the use of universal mechanisms in applications has been
precluded by the complexity of the universal language. In fact, when asking the agent to describe
principal j￿ s mechanism, principal i has to take into account that principal j￿ s mechanism may also
ask the agent to describe principal i￿ s mechanism, whether this mechanism depends on principal j￿ s
mechanism...and so on, leading to the so called ￿in￿nite regress￿problem. The universal language
is in fact obtained as the limit of a sequence of enlargements of the message space, where at each
enlargement the corresponding direct mechanism becomes more complex to describe and hence
more di¢ cult to use when searching for equilibrium outcomes.
The second solution, proposed by Peters (2001) and Martimort and Stole (2002), is to restrict
the principals to o⁄er menus of contracts. They have shown that, for any equilibrium relative to
any game with arbitrary sets of mechanisms for the principals, there exists an equilibrium in the
game in which the principals are restricted to o⁄er menus that sustains the same outcomes. In
this equilibrium, the principals simply o⁄er the menus in the range of the mechanisms they would
have o⁄ered in the equilibrium of the indirect game and delegate to the agent the choice of the
contractual terms. This result is referred to as the Menu Theorem and is the analog of the Taxation
Principle for games with a single mechanism designer.4
1We refer to the players who o⁄er the contracts either as the principals or as the mechanism designers. The two
expressions are meant to be synonyms. Furthermore, we adopt the convention of using feminine pronouns for the
principals and masculine pronouns for the agent.
2See, among others, Gibbard (1973), Green and La⁄ont (1977) and Myerson (1979).
3Problems with standard direct revelation mechanisms have been documented, among others, in Katz (1991),
McAfee (1993), Peck (1997), Epstein and Peters (1999), Peters (2001) and Martimort and Stole (1997, 2002). Recent
work by Peters (2003), Attar, Piaser and Porteiro (2007,a,b), and Attar, Majumadar, Piaser, and Porteiro (2007)
has identi￿ed special cases in which these problems do not emerge.
4The result is also referred to as the "Delegation Principle" (e.g. Martimort and Stole, 2002). For the Taxation
1The Menu Theorem has proved quite useful in applications. However, contrary to the Rev-
elation Principle, it provides no indication on how the agent uses the di⁄erent allocations in the
menu as a function of his private information, nor does it permit one to restrict attention to any
particular type of menus. This is what we aim at doing in this paper by showing that, in most
cases of interest for applications, one can still conveniently describe the agent￿ s interaction with
each of his principals through revelation mechanisms. The structure of these mechanisms is however
more general than the one for games with a single mechanism-designer. Nevertheless, contrary to
universal mechanisms, it is not conductive to any ￿in￿nite regress.￿In the revelation mechanisms
we propose, the agent is asked to report his exogenous type along with the endogenous (payo⁄-
relevant) decisions he is inducing with the other principals. To ￿x ideas, let V (￿;￿i;￿￿i) denote the
agent￿ s payo⁄, with ￿ 2 ￿ denoting the agent￿ s type, ￿i 2 Di denoting a decision for principal i and
￿￿i 2 D￿i denoting a pro￿le of decisions for all principals other than i:5 An incentive-compatible
revelation mechanism is a mapping ￿r
i : ￿ ￿ D￿i ! Di with the property that for any (￿;￿￿i),
￿r
i(￿;￿￿i) 2 argmax￿i2Im(￿r
i) V (￿;￿i;￿￿i), where Im(￿r
i) denotes the range of ￿r
i:
Describing the interaction of the agent with each of his principals through an incentive-
compatible revelation mechanism is convenient because it permits one to specify which decisions
the agent induces as a function of his type and the decisions he induces with the other principals.
In particular, it permits one to specify which decisions the agent takes in response to deviations by
any of the other principals. This in turn can give guidance on which outcomes can be sustained in
equilibrium.
The mechanisms described above are appealing because they capture the essence of common
agency, i.e., the fact that the agent￿ s preferences vis a vis the decisions of each principal depend
not only on his type ￿ but also on the decisions ￿￿i he induces with the other principals.6 However,
this property does not guarantee that it is always without loss to restrict the agent￿ s behavior
to depend only on (￿;￿￿i): In fact, when indi⁄erent, the agent may condition his behavior also
on payo⁄-irrelevant information such as the decisions included in the menus o⁄ered by the other
principals that he preferred not to select. Furthermore, when indi⁄erent, the agent may randomize
over the principals￿decisions inducing a correlation that cannot always be replicated by having the
agent simply report (￿;￿￿i) to each principal. As a consequence, not all outcomes can be sustained
by restricting the principals to o⁄er the simple revelation mechanisms described above.
While we ￿nd these considerations intriguing from a theoretical viewpoint, we seriously doubt
their relevance in applications.
Principle, see Rochet (1986) and Guesnerie (1995).
5Depending on the application of interest, a decision can be a price-quantity pair, as in the case of competion in
nonlinear tari⁄s, a reward scheme, as in menu auctions, or an incentive contract, as in moral hazard settings.
6A special case is when preferences are separable, as in Attar, Majumdar, Piasier, and Porteiro (2007), in which
case they depend only on ￿:
2Our concerns with mixed-strategy equilibria are the usual ones: outcomes sustained by the
agent mixing over the contracts o⁄ered by the principals or by the principals mixing over the
menus they o⁄er to the agent are typically not robust. Furthermore, when principals can o⁄er all
possible menus (including those containing lotteries over contracts), it is very hard to construct
(non-degenerate) examples in which the agent is made indi⁄erent over some of the contracts o⁄ered
by the principals and, at the same time, no principal has an incentive to change the composition
of her menu so as to break the agent￿ s indi⁄erence and induce him to choose the decisions that are
most favorable to her (see also the discussion in Section 5.2).
Our concerns with equilibrium outcomes sustained by a strategy for the agent that is not
Markov, i.e., that it depends also on payo⁄-irrelevant information, are motivated by the observa-
tion that this type of behavior does not seem plausible in most real-world situations. Think of a
buyer purchasing products or services from multiple sellers. While it is plausible that the qual-
ity/quantity purchased from seller i depends on the quality/quantity purchased from seller j (this
is the intrinsic nature of the common agency problem which leads to the failure of the standard
revelation principle), it does not seem plausible that, for given choice with seller j; the purchase
from seller i depends on payo⁄-irrelevant information such as the other price-quantity o⁄ers in
seller j￿ s menu that the buyer decided not to choose.7
For most of the analysis, we thus focus on outcomes sustained by pure-strategy pro￿les in
which the agent￿ s behavior is Markov.8 We ￿rst show that any such outcome can be sustained
as a truthful equilibrium of the revelation game. We also show that, despite the fact that only
certain menus can be o⁄ered in the revelation game, any truthful equilibrium is robust in the sense
that its outcome can also be sustained by an equilibrium of the menu game. This guarantees
that equilibrium outcomes in the revelation game are not arti￿cially sustained by the fact that the
principals are forced to choose from a restricted set of menus.
We then proceed by addressing the question of whether there exist environments in which
restricting the agent￿ s strategy to be Markov is not only appealing but actually without any loss of
generality. Clearly, this is always the case when the agent￿ s preferences are strict, for it is only when
the agent is indi⁄erent that his behavior may depend on payo⁄-irrelevant information. Furthermore,
even when the agent can be made indi⁄erent, restricting attention to Markov strategies is always
without loss of generality when information is complete and when the principals￿preferences are
su¢ ciently aligned in the following sense: for any pro￿le of decision ￿￿i; and for any menu of
decisions Di ￿ Di; there exists a decision ￿i 2 Di among those that are optimal for the agent given
￿￿i such that the payo⁄ of any principal Pj, j 6= i, under (￿i;￿￿i) is (weakly) lower than under any
7Note that the fact that the agent￿ s strategy is Markov does not imply that the principals can be restricted to
o⁄er menus that contain only the price-quantity pairs that are selected in equilibrium.
8Note that, while the de￿nition of Markov strategy given here is di⁄erent from the one considered in the literature
on dynamic games (see e.g. Pavan and Calzolari, 2008), it shares with that de￿nition the same spirit.
3other pro￿le (￿0
i;￿￿i) such that ￿0
i is optimal for the agent given ￿￿i. This condition guarantees that,
given ￿￿i; the decision the agent induces with Pi to punish a deviation by one of Pi￿ s opponents
need not depend on the identity of the deviating principal. This property is trivially satis￿ed when
there are only two principals. It is also satis￿ed, for example, when the principals are retailers
competing ￿a la Cournot￿in a downstream market (each retailer￿ s payo⁄ is then decreasing in the
quantity the agent￿ here in the role of a common manufacturer￿ sells to any of the other principals).
As for the restriction to complete information, the only role that this restriction plays is to rule
out the possibility that the equilibrium outcomes are sustained by the agent punishing a deviation,
say by principal j; by choosing in state ￿ the equilibrium decisions ￿￿
￿i(￿) with all principals other
than i and then changing his behavior with principal i by inducing a decision ￿i 6= ￿￿
i(￿): Allowing
type ￿ to respond to the equilibrium decisions ￿￿
￿i(￿) with a decision ￿i 6= ￿￿
i(￿) may be necessary
to discourage certain deviations by principal j. This in turn implies that Markov strategies need
not be without loss of generality when information is incomplete. However, because this is the
only complication that arises with incomplete information, we show that one can safely restrict
attention to Markov strategies if one imposes a mild re￿nement on the solution concept which
we call ￿Conformity to Equilibrium.￿This re￿nement simply imposes that each type of the agent
selects the equilibrium decision with each principal when the latter o⁄ers the equilibrium menu and
the decisions the agent induces with the other principals are the equilibrium ones.9 Again, in most
real world situations, we ￿nd such a behavior plausible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the contracting environment.
Section 3 contains the main characterization results. Section 4 shows how the simple revelation
mechanisms described above can be put to work in applications such as competition in non-linear
tari⁄s, menu auctions, and moral hazard settings. Section 5 shows how the revelation mechanisms
can be enriched to characterize also equilibrium outcomes sustained by non-Markov strategies
and/or mixed strategy equilibria. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are either in the Appendix or in
the Supplementary Material.
Quali￿cation. While the approach here is similar (in spirit) to the one in Pavan and Calzolari
(2008) for sequential common agency, there are important di⁄erences due to the simultaneity of
contracting. First, the notion of Markov strategies considered here is forward-looking instead of
backward-looking and takes into account the fact that, when choosing which messages to send to
principal i, the agent has not committed yet any decision with any of the other principals. Second,
contrary to sequential games, the agent can condition his behavior not only on the mechanisms
o⁄ered upstream but on the entire pro￿le of mechanisms o⁄ered by all principals. These di⁄erences
explain why, despite certain similarities, the results do not follow from the arguments in that paper.
9Note that this re￿nement is milder than the ￿conservative behavior￿re￿nement considered in Attar, Majumdar,
Piasier, and Porteiro (2007).
42 The environment
The following model encompasses essentially all variants of simultaneous common agency examined
in the literature.
Players, actions and contracts. There are n 2 N principals who contract simultaneously
and non-cooperatively with the same agent, A. Each principal Pi, i 2 N ￿ f1;:::;ng; must select
a contract yi from a set of feasible contracts Yi. A contract yi : E ! ￿(Ai) speci￿es (a lottery
over) the actions ai 2 Ai that Pi will take in response to the agent￿ s action/e⁄ort e 2 E:10 Both
ai and e may have di⁄erent interpretations depending on the application of interest. When the
agent is a buyer purchasing from multiple sellers, ai stands for the price of seller i and e for a
vector of quantities/qualities. When instead A is a politician lobbied by di⁄erent interest groups,
ai represents a campaign contribution and E the set of relevant policies.
Depending on the environment, the set of feasible contracts Yi may also be more or less re-
stricted. For example, in a trade relationship, the price ai of seller i may not depend on the
quantities/qualities of other sellers.11 In a moral hazard model, because e is not observable by
the principals, the function yi : E ! ￿(Ai) is necessarily constant over E and an action ai 2 Ai
represents a state-contingent payment that rewards the agent as a function of some exogenous
performance measure correlated with the agent￿ s e⁄ort. Finally, in certain environments, only
deterministic contracts may be enforceable which can be captured by restricting each yi 2 Yi to
respond to each e 2 E with a degenerate lottery yi(e) that assigns measure one to an element of
Ai.
Payo⁄s. Principal i￿ s payo⁄is described by the function ui (e;a;￿); whereas the agent￿ s payo⁄
by the function v (e;a;￿): The vector a ￿ (a1;:::;an) 2 A ￿
Qn
i=1 Ai denotes a pro￿le of actions
for the principals, while the variable ￿ denotes the agent￿ s exogenous private information. The
principals share a common prior over ￿ represented by the distribution F with support ￿. All
players are expected-utility maximizers.
To avoid the usual measure-theoretic complications, we will often assume that A, E and ￿ are
￿nite sets.
Mechanisms. Principals compete in mechanisms. A mechanism for Pi consists of a message
(or communication) space Mi and a measurable mapping ￿i : Mi ! Di where Di ￿ ￿(Yi) denotes a
(compact) set of feasible lotteries over Yi:12 When A selects a message mi 2 Mi, Pi thus randomizes
10Throughout, for any measurable set ￿; ￿(￿) will denote the set of probability measures over ￿: Furthermore,
given any ! 2 ￿(￿), Supp[!] will denote the support of !:
11An exception is Martimort and Stole (2005).
12Again, depending on the application, the sets Di may be more or less restricted. For example, in certain
applications, it is customary to assume that, not only the contracts yi must be deterministic, but also the lotteries
over the contracts Yi selected through the mechanism must be degenerate. More generally, the sets Di incorporate
5over Yi according to the lottery ￿i = ￿i(mi) 2 Di:
In the following, we will refer to ai 2 Ai as the action and to ￿i as the decision for principal i.
When A does not have any action to take after communicating with the principals (that is, when
jEj = 1), ￿i reduces to a lottery over the set Ai of payo⁄-relevant actions.
To save on notation, in the sequel we will denote a mechanism simply by ￿i, thus dropping the
speci￿cation of the message space Mi whenever this does not create confusion. Given a mechanism
￿i we then denote by Im(￿i) ￿ f￿i 2 ￿(Yi) : 9 mi 2 Mi s.t. ￿i(mi) = ￿ig the set of lotteries in the
range of ￿i.
For any common agency game ￿, we will then denote by ￿i the set of feasible mechanisms
for Pi, by ￿ ￿ (￿1;:::;￿n) 2 ￿ ￿
Qn
j=1 ￿j a pro￿le of mechanisms for the n principals, and by
￿￿i ￿ (￿1;:::;￿i￿1;￿i+1;:::;￿n) 2 ￿￿i ￿
Q
j6=i ￿j a collection of mechanisms for all Pj with j 6= i:13
As is standard, we assume that principals can fully commit to their mechanisms and that each
principal cannot contract directly over the decisions by other principals.14
Timing. The sequence of events is the following.
￿ At t = 0; A learns ￿:
￿ At t = 1; each Pi simultaneously and independently o⁄ers the agent a mechanism ￿i 2 ￿i:
￿ At t = 2; A privately sends a message mi 2 Mi to each Pi after observing the whole array of
mechanisms ￿: The messages (m1;:::;mn) are sent simultaneously.15
￿ At t = 3; the contracts (y1;:::;yn) are determined independently by the lotteries (￿1(m1);:::;￿n(mn)):
￿ At t = 4; A chooses e 2 E after observing the contracts (y1;:::;yn):
￿ At t = 5, the principals￿actions (a1;:::;an) are determined independently by the lotteries
(y1(e);:::;yn(e)) and payo⁄s are realized.
all sorts of exogenous restrictions dictated by the environment under examination. What is important to us, is that
the set of feasible lotteries Di is a primitive of the environment, not a choice of Pi:
13We also de￿ne ￿ ￿ (￿1;:::;￿n) 2 D ￿
Qn
j=1 Dj; m ￿ (m1;:::;mn) 2 M ￿
Qn
j=1 Mj, y ￿ (y1;:::;yn) 2 Y ￿
Qn
j=1 Yj; ￿￿i 2 D￿i; m￿i 2 M￿i, and y￿i 2 Y￿i in the same way.
14As in Bernheim and Whinston (1986), this does not mean that Pi cannot reward the agent as a function of
the actions he takes with the other principals: It simply means that Pi cannot make her contract yi : E ! ￿(Ai)
contingent on the other principals￿contracts y￿i, nor her mechanism ￿i contingent on the other principals￿mechanisms
￿￿i:
15As in Peters (2001) and Martimort and Stole (2002), we do not model the agent￿ s participation decisions: these
can be easily accommodated by adding to each mechanism a null contract that leads to the default decisions that are
implemented in case of no participation such as, for example, no trade at a null price.
6Strategies and equilibria. A strategy for Pi is a distribution ￿i 2 ￿(￿i) over the set of
feasible mechanisms. As for the agent, a strategy ￿A = (￿;￿) consists of a mapping ￿ : ￿ ￿ ￿ !
￿(M) that speci￿es a distribution over M for any (￿;￿); along with a mapping ￿ : ￿￿￿￿M￿Y !
￿(E) that speci￿es a distribution over e⁄ort for any (￿;￿;m;y):
Following Peters (2001), we will say that the strategy ￿A = (￿;￿) constitutes a continuation
equilibrium for ￿ if for every (￿;￿;m;y), any e 2 Supp[￿(￿;￿;m;y)] maximizes
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￿ V (e;y;￿)d￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ d￿n
the maximal payo⁄ that A can obtain given the principals￿decisions ￿:
Denoting by ￿￿A(￿;￿) 2 ￿(A ￿ E) the distribution over outcomes induced by ￿A given ￿ and
the pro￿le of mechanisms ￿; we then have that principal i￿ s expected payo⁄ when he chooses the

















A perfect Bayesian equilibrium for ￿ is thus a strategy pro￿le ￿ ￿ (f￿i;gn
i=1;￿A) such that ￿A
is a continuation equilibrium and for every i 2 N,
￿i 2 arg max
~ ￿i2￿(￿i)
Ui(~ ￿i;￿￿i;￿A):
Throughout, we will denote the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria of ￿ by E(￿) and, for any
￿￿ 2 E(￿); the associated social choice function (SCF) by ￿￿￿ : ￿ ! ￿(A ￿ E):
Menus. A menu is a mechanism ￿M
i : MM
i ! Di whose message space MM
i ￿ Di is a
subset of all possible decisions and whose mapping is the identity function, i.e. for any ￿i 2 MM
i ;
￿M
i (￿i) = ￿i. In what follows, we denote by ￿M
i the set of all possible menus for principal i and
by ￿M the ￿menu game￿in which the set of feasible mechanisms for each Pi is ￿M
i : The game ￿ is
an enlargement of ￿M (￿ < ￿M) if for all i 2 N, (i) there exists an embedding ￿i : ￿M
i ! ￿i;16
16Formally, an embedding ￿i : ￿
M
i ! ￿i can here be thought of as an injective mapping such that, for any pair of
mechanisms ￿
M
i ;￿i with ￿i = ￿i(￿
M
i ); Im(￿i) = Im(￿
M
i ):
7and (ii) for any ￿i 2 ￿i; Im(￿i) is compact. A simple example of an enlargement of ￿M is a game
in which ￿i ￿ ￿M
i for all i: More generally, an enlargement is a game in which every ￿i is larger
than ￿M
i in the sense that each menu ￿M
i is also present in ￿i, although possibly with a di⁄erent
representation. The game in which the principals compete in menus is ￿focal￿in the sense of the
following theorem (cfr Peters, 2001, and Martimort and Stole, 2002).
Theorem 1 (Menus) Let ￿ be any enlargement of ￿M: A SCF ￿ can be sustained as an equilib-
rium of ￿ if and only if it can be sustained as an equilibrium of ￿M:
When ￿ is not an enlargement of ￿M, for example because only certain menus can be o⁄ered
in ￿, there may exist outcomes in ￿ that cannot be sustained as equilibrium outcomes in ￿M and
vice-versa. In this case, one can still characterize all equilibrium outcomes of ￿ using menus, but
it is necessary to restrict the principals to o⁄er only those menus that could have been o⁄ered in
￿ : that is, the set of feasible menus for Pi must be restricted to ~ ￿M
i ￿ f￿M
i : Im(￿M
i ) = Im(￿i) for
some ￿i 2 ￿ig:
In the sequel we will restrict attention to environments in which all menus are feasible. The
purpose of our results is to show that, in many applications of interest, one can restrict the principals
to o⁄er menus that can be conveniently described as incentive-compatible revelation mechanisms.
This in turn may facilitate the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes.
3 Simple revelation mechanisms
Motivated by the arguments discussed in the introduction, in this section we focus on outcomes
that can be sustained by pure-strategy pro￿les in which the agent￿ s strategy is Markov.
De￿nition 1 (i) Given the common agency game ￿; an equilibrium strategy pro￿le ￿ 2 E(￿) is a
pure-strategy equilibrium if (a) no principal randomizes over her mechanisms; (b) given any
pro￿le of mechanisms ￿ 2 ￿ and any ￿ 2 ￿; the agent does not randomize over the messages he
sends to the principals.
(ii) The agent￿ s strategy ￿A is Markov in ￿ if and only if, for any i 2 N, ￿i 2 ￿i; ￿ 2 ￿
and ￿￿i 2 D￿i, there exists a unique ￿i(￿;￿￿i;￿i) 2 Im(￿i) such that A always induces ￿i(￿;￿￿i;￿i)
with Pi when the latter o⁄ers the mechanism ￿i; the agent￿ s type is ￿ and the decisions A induces
with the other principals are ￿￿i:
An equilibrium strategy pro￿le is thus a pure-strategy equilibrium if no principal randomizes
over her mechanisms and no type of the agent randomize over the messages to the principals. Note
that the agent may however randomize over his choice of e⁄ort.
The agent￿ s strategy ￿A in ￿ is Markov if and only if the decisions the agent induces in each
mechanism ￿i depend only on his type ￿ and the decisions ￿￿i he is inducing with the other
8principals￿ and not on the particular pro￿le of mechanisms (or menus) o⁄ered by the latter. As
anticipated in the introduction, this de￿nition is di⁄erent from the one typically considered in
dynamic games but it shares with the latter the idea that the agent￿ s behavior should depend only
on payo⁄-relevant information.
De￿nition 2 (i) An incentive-compatible revelation mechanism is a mapping ￿r
i : Mr
i !
Di, with message space Mr
i ￿ ￿￿D￿i, such that Im(￿r
i) is compact and, for any (￿;￿￿i) 2 ￿￿D￿i;
￿r




(ii) A revelation game ￿r is a game in which each principal￿ s strategy space is ￿(￿r
i), where
￿r
i is the set of all revelation mechanisms for principal i:
(iii) Given a pro￿le of mechanisms ￿r 2 ￿r, the agent￿ s strategy is truthful in ￿r
i if, for any









(iv) An equilibrium strategy pro￿le ￿r￿ 2 E(￿r) is a truthful equilibrium if, given any pro￿le
of mechanisms ￿r such that jfj 2 N : ￿r
j = 2 Supp[￿r￿




In a revelation mechanism, the agent is thus asked to report his type ￿ along with the decisions
￿￿i he is inducing with the other principals. Given a pro￿le of mechanisms ￿r, the agent￿ s strategy
is truthful in ￿r
i if the message mr
i = (￿;￿￿i) the agent reports to Pi coincides with his true type




j6=i that the agent induces with all principals other
than i by sending the messages m￿i ￿ (mj)j6=i. An equilibrium strategy pro￿le is then said to be
a truthful equilibrium if, whenever at most one principal deviated from equilibrium play, the agent
reports truthfully to any of the non-deviating principals.
The following is our ￿rst characterization result.
Theorem 2 Suppose the SCF ￿ can be sustained as a pure-strategy equilibrium of ￿M in which
the agent￿ s strategy is Markov. Then it can also be sustained as a truthful pure-strategy equilibrium
of ￿r: Furthermore, any SCF ￿ that can be sustained as an equilibrium of ￿r can also be sustained
as an equilibrium of ￿M:
First, consider the "only if" part of the result. When the agent￿ s choice from each menu
depends only on his type ￿ and the decisions ￿￿i he is inducing with the other principals, it is
immediate that each principal can be restricted to o⁄er the decisions ￿i(￿;￿￿i;￿M￿
i ) that the agent
would have selected from the equilibrium menu ￿M￿
i for some (￿;￿￿i): Describing the menu of such
decisions as a revelation mechanisms is then a convenient way of specifying which decisions the
9agent takes in response to each (￿;￿￿i). As illustrated in the next section, this often facilitates the
characterization of the equilibrium allocations.
Next, consider the "if" part of the result. Despite the fact that ￿r is not an enlargement of
￿M; the result follows from arguments similar to those used to establish the Menu Theorem. The
equilibrium ￿M￿ that sustains ￿ in ￿M features each principal o⁄ering the menus in the range of
the equilibrium direct mechanism in ￿r: When all principals o⁄er the equilibrium menus, the agent
implements the same decisions he would have implemented in ￿r. When, instead, one principal,
say Pi, deviates and o⁄ers a menu ￿M
i = 2 Supp[￿M￿
i ], the agent implements the same decisions he
would have implemented in ￿r had Pi o⁄ered the direct mechanism ￿r
i such that
￿r
i(￿;￿￿i) 2 arg max
￿i2Im(￿M
i )
V (￿i;￿￿i;￿) 8(￿;￿￿i) 2 ￿ ￿ D￿i:
The behavior prescribed by the strategy ￿M￿
A constructed this way is clearly rational for the agent
in ￿M. Furthermore, given ￿M￿
A ; no principal has an incentive to deviate.
Although in most applications restricting attention to Markov strategies seems perfectly rea-
sonable, it is interesting to examine whether there exist special environments in which such a
restriction is without any loss of generality. To address this question, we ￿rst need to introduce






uk (a;￿k(￿;y);￿)dy1(￿k(￿;y)) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ dyn(￿k(￿;y))
￿
d￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ d￿n (1)
denote the minimal payo⁄ for principal k that is compatible with the agent￿ s rationality, where











Condition 1 (Uniform Punishment) We say that the "Uniform Punishment" condition holds
if for any i 2 N; B ￿ Di; ￿￿i 2 D￿i, and ￿ 2 ￿, there exists a ￿0
i 2 argmax￿i2B V (￿i;￿￿i;￿) such
that for all j 6= i and all ^ ￿i 2 argmax￿i2B V (￿i;￿￿i;￿);
Uj(￿0
i;￿￿i;￿) ￿ Uj(^ ￿i;￿￿i;￿):
The condition says that the principals￿preferences are su¢ ciently aligned in the sense that,
given any menu of decisions B ￿ Di o⁄ered by Pi and any (￿;￿￿i); there exists a decision ￿0
i 2 B
that is optimal for the agent given (￿;￿￿i) such that the payo⁄ of any principal Pj; j 6= i, under ￿0
i
is lower than under any other decision ￿i 2 B that is optimal for the agent:
We then have the following result.
10Theorem 3 Suppose one of the following holds:
(a) for any i 2 N, B ￿ Di; and (￿;￿￿i) 2 ￿ ￿ D￿i, jargmax￿i2B V (￿i;￿￿i;￿)j = 1;
(b) j￿j = 1 and the "Uniform Punishment" condition holds.
Then any SCF that can be sustained as a pure-strategy equilibrium of ￿M can also be sustained
as a pure-strategy equilibrium in which the agent￿ s strategy is Markov.
Condition (a) says that the agent￿ s preferences are "single-peaked" in the sense that, for any
(￿;￿￿i) 2 ￿￿D￿i and any menu of decisions B ￿ Di, there is a single decision in B that maximizes
the agent￿ s payo⁄. Clearly in this case the agent￿ s strategy is necessarily Markov.
Condition (b) says that information is complete and that the principals￿payo⁄s are su¢ ciently
aligned in the sense of the Uniform Punishment condition. The role of this condition is to guarantee
that, given ￿￿i; the agent can punish any principal Pj, j 6= i, by taking the same decision with
principal i: Note that this condition is satis￿ed, for example, when the agent is a manufacturer and
the principals are retailers competing a￿la Cournot in a downstream market; in fact, in this case




where qi denotes the quantity purchased by Pi, ti the total payment made by Pi to the manufacturer,
and f : R+ ! R the inverse demand function. In this environment, j￿j = jEj = 1. A (deterministic)
contract ￿i is thus a degenerate lottery that assigns measure one to a single price-quantity pair
(ti;qi) 2 R ￿ R+: It is then immediate that, given any menu B ￿ R ￿ R+ (i.e. any array of
price-quantity pairs) o⁄ered by Pi; and any pro￿le of contracts (t￿i;q￿i) 2 Rn￿1 ￿ Rn￿1
+ selected
by the agent with the other principals, the contract (ti;qi) 2 B that minimizes Pj￿ s payo⁄ among
those that are optimal for the agent given (t￿i;q￿i) is the one that entails the highest quantity qi,
and this is true for any Pj; j 6= i: The Uniform Punishment condition thus clearly holds in this
environment.
The reason why one needs information to be complete in addition to enough alignment in the
principals￿preferences can be illustrated through the following example where n = 2 in which case
the Uniform Punishment condition trivially holds. The sets of primitive decisions are A1 = ft;bg
and A2 = fl;rg. There is no e⁄ort so that a deterministic contract coincides with the choice of a
decision ai 2 Ai. There are two types of the agent, ￿ and ￿. The principals￿common prior is that
Pr(￿ = ￿) = p < 1=5: Payo⁄s, (u1;u2;v) are as in the following table:
￿ = ￿
a1na2 l r
t 2 1 1 2 0 0
b 1 0 1 1 2 2
￿ = ￿
a1na2 l r
t 2 2 2 ￿2 0 2
b 1 0 1 ￿2 1 1
Table 1
11Consider the following (deterministic) SCF: if ￿ = ￿; then a1 = b and a2 = r; if ￿ = ￿; then a1 = t
and a2 = l: This SCF can be sustained as a (pure-strategy) equilibrium of the menu game in which
the agent￿ s strategy is non-Markov. The equilibrium features P1 o⁄ering the menu ￿M￿
1 = ft;bg
and P2 o⁄ering the menu ￿M￿
2 = fl;rg. Clearly P2 does not have pro￿table deviations because she
is getting in each state her maximal feasible payo⁄. If P1 deviates and o⁄ers ftg then A selects
(t;l) if ￿ = ￿ and (t;r) if ￿ = ￿ (given (￿;t); A has strict preferences for l, whereas given (￿;t); he is
indi⁄erent between l and r). A deviation to ftg thus yields a payo⁄ U1 = 2(1￿p)￿2p = 2￿4p to
P1 that is lower than her equilibrium payo⁄ U￿
1 = 1+p when p > 1=5: A deviation to fbg is clearly
never pro￿table for P1, irrespective of the agent￿ s behavior. Thus the SCF ￿￿ described above can
be sustained in equilibrium.
Now to see that this SCF cannot be sustained by restricting the agent￿ s strategy to be Markov,
￿rst note that it is essential that ￿M￿
2 contains both l and r because in equilibrium A must choose
di⁄erent a2 for di⁄erent ￿: Restricting the agent￿ s strategy to be Markov then means that when P2
o⁄ers the equilibrium menu, A necessarily chooses r if ￿ = ￿ and a1 = b and l if ￿ = ￿ and a1 = t:
Furthermore, because given (￿;t); A strictly prefers l to r; A necessarily chooses l when ￿ = ￿ and
a1 = t: Given this behavior, if P1 deviates and o⁄ers the menu ￿M
1 = ftg, she then gets a payo⁄
U1 = 2(1 ￿ p) + 2p = 2 > U￿
1:
The reason why, when information is incomplete, restricting the agent￿ s strategy to be Markov
may preclude the possibility of sustaining certain SCFs is that Markov strategies do not permit
the same type of the agent, say ￿0, to punish a deviation by a principal Pj; j 6= i; by choosing with
all principals other than i the equilibrium decisions ￿￿
￿i(￿0) and then choosing with Pi a decision
￿i 6= ￿￿
i(￿0) to punish Pj. Allowing type ￿0 to change his behavior in response to the equilibrium
decisions ￿￿
￿i(￿0) may thus be essential to punish certain deviations. However, because this is the
only reason why one needs j￿j = 1, the assumption of complete information can be dispensed with
if one imposes the following re￿nement on the agent￿ s continuation equilibrium.
Condition 2 (Conformity to Equilibrium) Let ￿ be any simultaneous common agency game.
Given any pure-strategy equilibrium ￿￿ 2 E(￿), let ￿￿ denote the equilibrium mechanisms and
￿￿(￿) the equilibrium decisions implemented when the agent￿ s type is ￿: We say that the agent￿ s







In words, the agent￿ s strategy satis￿es the Conformity to Equilibrium condition if each type of
the agent induces the equilibrium decision ￿￿
i(￿) with each principal Pi when the latter o⁄ers the
equilibrium mechanism ￿￿
i and the agent induces the equilibrium decisions ￿￿
￿i(￿) with the other
principals. In many applications, this seems a mild requirement. We then have the following result.
12Theorem 4 Suppose the principals￿payo⁄s are su¢ ciently aligned in the sense of the Uniform
Punishment condition. Suppose in addition that the SCF ￿ can be sustained as a pure-strategy
equilibrium ￿M￿ 2 E(￿M) in which the agent￿ s strategy ￿M￿
A satis￿es the "Conformity to Equilib-
rium" condition. Then, ￿ can also be sustained as a pure-strategy equilibrium ~ ￿M￿ 2 E(￿M) in
which the agent￿ s strategy ~ ￿M￿
A is Markov.
By implication, when the principals￿payo⁄s are su¢ ciently aligned (e.g. when n = 2), even if
j￿j > 1; any SCF ￿ that can be sustained as a pure-strategy equilibrium of ￿M in which the agent￿ s
strategy satis￿es the "Conformity to Equilibrium" condition, can also be sustained as a truthful
pure-strategy equilibrium of the revelation game ￿r:
At this point, it is useful to contrast our results with those in Peters (2003, 2007) and Attar,
Majumdar, Piasier, and Porteiro (2007). Peters (2003, 2007) considers environments in which a
certain ￿no-externality condition￿ holds and shows that in these environments all pure-strategy
equilibria can be characterized by restricting the principals to o⁄er standard direct revelation
mechanisms ￿i : ￿ ￿! Di.17 The no-externality condition requires that (i) each principal￿ s payo⁄
be independent of the other principals￿actions a￿i and (ii) that conditional on choosing e⁄ort in a
certain equivalence class ^ E,18 the agent￿ s preferences over any set of decisions B ￿ Ai by principal
i be independent of the particular e⁄ort the agent chooses in ^ E, of his type ￿, and of the actions
a￿i he induces with the other principals. Attar, Majumdar, Piasier, and Porteiro (2007) show
that in environments in which the only feasible contracts are deterministic, all action spaces are
￿nite, and the agent￿ s preferences are ￿separable￿ and ￿generic￿ , condition (i) in Peters can be
dispensed with: all equilibrium outcomes of the menu game (including mixed-strategy ones) can
be sustained also in the game in which the principals￿strategy space consists of all standard direct
revelation mechanisms. Separability requires that the agent￿ s preferences over the decisions of any
of the principals be independent of his choice of e⁄ort and of the decisions of the other principals.
Genericity requires that the agent never be indi⁄erent between any pair of e⁄ort choices and/or
any pair of decisions by any of the principals.19 Combined these restrictions guarantee that the
17A standard direct revelation mechanism reduces to a take-it-or-leave-it-o⁄ers￿ i.e. to a degenerate menu consisting
of a single contract yi : E ￿! ￿(Yi)￿ when the agent does not possess any exogenous private information, i.e. when
j￿j = 1:
18In the language of Peters, an equivalence class ^ E ￿ E is a subset of E such that any feasible contract of Pi must
respond to each e;e
0 2 ^ E with the same action, i.e. yi(e) = yi(e
0) for any e;e
0 2 ^ E:
19Formally, separability requires that any type ￿ of the agent who strictly prefers ai to a
0
i when the decisions by
all principals other than i are a￿i and his choice of e⁄ort is e also strictly prefers ai to a
0
i when the decisions taken
by all principals other than i are a
0
￿i and his choice of e⁄ort is e
0; for any (a￿i;e);(a
0
￿i;e
0) 2 A￿i ￿ E. Genericity
requires that , given any (￿;ai) 2 ￿ ￿ Ai, v(￿;ai;a￿i;e) 6= v(￿;ai;a
0
￿i;e
0) for any (e;a￿i);(e;a￿i) 2 E ￿ A￿i with
(e;a￿i) 6= (e;a￿i): Note that in general separability is neither weaker nor stronger than condition (ii) in Peters
(2003, 2007). In fact, separability requires the agent￿ s preferences over Pi￿ s actions to be independent of e; whereas
13messages each type of the agent sends to any of his principals do not depend on the messages he
sends to the other principals; restricting attention to standard direct revelation mechanisms is then
clearly without loss.
Compared to these results, our result in Theorem 2 does not require any restriction on the
players￿preferences. Provided one is willing to restrict attention to equilibria in which the agent￿ s
strategy is Markov, then all pure-strategy equilibrium outcomes can be characterized through
a simple generalization of the class of standard direct revelation mechanisms in which the agent
reports the decisions ￿￿i in addition to his type ￿: Because in most applications of interest, assuming
the agent strategy is Markov is appealing, Theorem 2 thus provides a possible route to equilibrium
characterization that does not require any restriction on the players￿preferences. Theorem 3 in
turn guarantees that restricting attention to Markov strategies is not only appealing but actually
without any loss of generality when either the agent￿ s preferences are single-peaked or information
is complete and the principals￿preferences are su¢ ciently aligned in the sense of the Uniform
Punishment condition.
Our results are thus complementary to those in Peters (2003, 2007) and Attar, Majumdar,
Piasier, and Porteiro (2007) in the sense that they are particularly useful precisely in environments
in which one cannot restrict attention neither to simple take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers nor standard direct
revelation mechanisms. For example, consider a pure adverse selection setting with only determin-
istic contracts,20 as in the baseline model of Attar, Majumdar, Piasier, and Porteiro (2007). Then
condition (a) in Theorem 3 is equivalent to the ￿genericity￿condition in their paper. If, in addition,
preferences are separable (in the sense described above), then Theorem 1 in their paper implies
that all equilibrium outcomes can be sustained by restricting the principals to o⁄er standard direct
revelation mechanisms. If, instead, they are not separable,21 then all equilibrium outcomes can still
be characterized restricting the principals to o⁄er direct revelation mechanisms but the latter must
be extended to allow the agent to report the decisions ￿￿i he is inducing with the other principals
in addition to his type ￿:
Also note that, when action spaces are continuous, as typically assumed in many applied
papers, Attar, Majumdar, Piasier, and Porteiro (2007) need to impose a restriction on the agent￿ s
behavior. This restriction, which they call ￿conservative behavior￿consists in requiring that, after
condition (ii) in Peters only requires them to be independent of the particular e⁄ort the agent chooses in a given
equivalence class. On the other hand, condition (ii) in Peters imposes that the agent￿ s preferences over Pi￿ s actions
be independent of the agent￿ s type, whereas such a dependence is allowed by separability. The two conditions are
however equivalent in standard moral hazard settings (i.e. when e⁄ort is completely unobservable so that ^ E = E and
information is complete so that j￿j = 1).
20A pure adverse selction setting with only deterministic contracts is an environment in which jEj = 1 and where,
for all i; Di contains only degenerate lotteries that assign measure one to one of the elements of Ai.
21As, for example, in the case of a buyer whose preferences for the quality/quantity of the product/service of seller
i depend on the quality/quantity purchased from seller j.
14a deviation by Pk; each type ￿ of the agent continues to choose the equilibrium decisions ￿￿
￿k(￿)
with the non-deviating principals whenever this is compatible with the agent￿ s rationality. This
restriction is stronger than the "Conformity to Equilibrium" condition introduced above. Hence,
even with separable preferences, the more general revelation mechanisms introduced here may turn
useful in applications in which imposing the "conservative behavior" property seems too restrictive.
4 Using revelation mechanisms in applications
Equipped with the results established in the preceding session, we now show how revelation mech-
anisms can be put to work in applications to identify necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the
sustainability of outcomes as common agency equilibria. We consider three cases of interest: com-
petition in non-linear tari⁄s, menu auctions, and a (simpli￿ed version of a standard) moral hazard
setting.
4.1 Competition in non-linear tari⁄s
Consider an environment in which P1 and P2 are two sellers providing two di⁄erentiated products to
a common buyer, A. In this environment, there is no e⁄ort and an action for principal i consists of
a price-quantity pair (ti;qi) 2 Ai ￿ R￿Q, where Q = [0; ￿ Q] denotes the set of feasible quantities.22
The buyer￿ s payo⁄ is given by v(a;￿) = ￿(q1 + q2) + ￿q1q2 ￿ t1 ￿ t2, where ￿ parametrizes the
degree of complementarity/substitutability between the two products, while ￿ denotes the buyer￿ s
type which is assumed to be distributed over the interval ￿ = [￿;￿ ￿], ￿ > 0; with log-concave density
f strictly positive for any ￿: The sellers￿payo⁄s are given by ui(a;￿) = ti￿C(qi); with C(q) = q2=2:
The buyer can participate in one mechanism without participating in the other (in the literature
this is referred to as non-intrinsic common agency). In the case A decides not to participate in Pi￿ s
mechanism, the default contract (0;0) with no trade and zero transfer is implemented.
Following the pertinent literature, we assume here that only deterministic mechanisms ￿i :
Mi ￿! Ai are feasible. Note that any such mechanism is strategically-equivalent to a non-linear
tari⁄ Ti such that, for any qi, T(qi) = minfti : (ti;qi) 2 Im(￿i)g if fti : (ti;qi) 2 Im(￿i)g 6= ? and
T(qi) = 1 otherwise. It is also immediate that any such tari⁄ is equivalent to a menu of price-
quantity pairs (see also Peters, 2001, 2004). The question of interest is which tari⁄s will be o⁄ered
in equilibrium and how they can be conveniently characterized using incentive-compatibility.
22An alternative way of modelling this environment is the following. The set of primitive actions for each principal
i consists of the set R of all possible prices. A contract for Pi then consists of a tari⁄ yi : Q ￿! R that speci￿es
a price for each possible quantity q 2 Q. Given a pair of tari⁄s y = (y1;y2); the agent￿ s e⁄ort then consists of the
choice of a pair of quantities e = (q1;q2) 2 E = Q
2: While the two approaches ultimately lead to the same results,
we ￿nd the one proposed in the text more parsimonious.
15Following the discussion in the previous sections, we focus on pure-strategy equilibria in which
the agent￿ s strategy is Markov.
First, we show how revelation mechanisms help identify necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
the implementability of schedules q￿
i : ￿ ￿! Q. Next, we show how these conditions can be used
to prove that there is no equilibrium that sustains the schedules qc : ￿ ￿! Q that maximize the
sellers￿joint payo⁄s (these schedules are referred to in the literature as the "collusive schedules").
Last, we identify su¢ cient conditions for the sustainability of di⁄erentiable schedules.
Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the implementability of schedules.
By Theorem 2, the schedules q￿
i (￿); i = 1;2; can be sustained as a pure-strategy equilibrium of
￿M in which the agent￿ s strategy is Markov if and only if they can be sustained as a pure-strategy
truthful equilibrium of ￿r: Now let
mi(￿) ￿ ￿ + ￿q￿
j(￿)
denote type ￿￿ s marginal valuation for qi when he purchases the equilibrium quantity q￿
j(￿) from Pj,
j 6= i: In what follows we restrict attention to schedules q￿(￿) = (q￿
i (￿))i=1;2 for which the functions
mi(￿) are strictly increasing, i = 1;2. Because for any (compact) collection of price-quantity pairs
B ￿ Ai and any pair (￿;qj;tj) and (￿0;q0
j;t0









and because there are no direct externalities between the two principals, it is immediate that





whenever ￿ + ￿qj = ￿0 + ￿q0
j: In the sequel we thus restrict attention to such mechanism which,
with a slight abuse of notation, we denote by ￿r
i = (~ qi(~ ￿i);~ ti(~ ￿i))~ ￿i2~ ￿i; where
~ ￿i ￿ f~ ￿i 2 R : ~ ￿i = ￿ + ￿qi; ￿ 2 ￿; qi 2 Qg
denotes the set of the agent￿ s possible marginal valuations for Pi￿ s quantity. Note that these
mechanisms specify price-quantity pairs also for ~ ￿i that have zero measure on the equilibrium
path. As discussed in the literature, sellers may need to include in their menus also allocations
that are selected only o⁄ equilibrium to punish deviations by other sellers.23 These allocations are
typically obtained by extending the principals￿tari⁄s outside the equilibrium range. Identifying the
appropriate extensions can however be quite complicated. One of the advantages of the approach
suggested here is that it permits one to use incentive-compatibility to describe such extensions.
Now note that, because the set ~ ￿i is an interval and because the function ~ v(~ ￿;q) ￿ ~ ￿q is
equi-Lipschitz continuous and di⁄erentiable in ~ ￿ and satis￿es the increasing-di⁄erence property,
from standard results in mechanism design (see e.g. Milgrom and Segal, 2002), the mechanism
23Such allocations are also referred to as "latent contracts" (see, e.g. Piasier, 2007).
16￿r
i = (~ qi(￿);~ ti(￿)) is incentive-compatible if and only if the function ~ qi(￿) is non-decreasing and the
function ~ ti(￿) satis￿es
~ ti(~ ￿i) = ~ ￿i~ qi(~ ￿i) ￿
Z ~ ￿i
min ~ ￿i
~ qi(s)ds ￿ Ki 8~ ￿i 2 ~ ￿i;
where Ki is a constant. Next note that for any pair of mechanisms (￿r
i)i=1;2 for which there exists
an i 2 N and a ~ ￿i 2 ~ ￿i such that an agent with marginal valuation ~ ￿i strictly prefers the null
contract (0;0) to the contract (~ qi(~ ￿i);~ ti(~ ￿i)), there exists another pair of mechanisms (￿r0
i )i=1;2
such that (i) any ~ ￿i 2 ~ ￿i weakly prefers the contract (~ qi(~ ￿i);~ ti(~ ￿i)) to the contract (0;0), i = 1;2,
and (ii) (￿r0
i )i=1;2 sustains the same outcomes as (￿r
i)i=1;2:24 It is thus without loss of generality to
restrict Ki ￿ 0: We then have the following result.
Proposition 1 The schedules q￿
i (￿); i = 1;2; can be sustained as a pure-strategy equilibrium of
￿M in which the agent￿ s strategy is Markov if and only if there exist non-decreasing functions
~ qi : ~ ￿i ! Q and scalars ~ Ki ￿ 0; i = 1;2; such that the following conditions hold:
(a) for any ~ ￿i 2 [mi(￿);mi(￿ ￿)]; ~ qi(~ ￿i) = q￿
i (m￿1
i (~ ￿i)); i = 1;2;25
(b) for any ￿ 2 ￿ and any pair (~ ￿1;~ ￿2) 2 ~ ￿1 ￿ ~ ￿2





~ q1(~ ￿1) + ~ q2(~ ￿2)
i
+ ￿~ q1(~ ￿1)~ q2(~ ￿2) ￿ ~ t1(~ ￿1) ￿ ~ t2(~ ￿2)
o




2(￿) ￿ ~ t1(m1(￿1)) ￿ ~ t2(m2(￿2)) and, for i = 1;2;
~ ti(~ ￿i) ￿ ~ ￿i~ q(~ ￿i) ￿
Z ~ ￿i
min ~ ￿i
~ qi(s)ds ￿ ~ Ki; (3)











dF(￿) = ￿ Ui (4)









i (￿;qi(￿)) ￿ ti(￿) ￿ ￿qi(^ ￿) + v￿
i (￿;qi(^ ￿)) ￿ ti(^ ￿) 8(￿;^ ￿) (IC)
￿qi(￿) + v￿
i (￿;qi(￿)) ￿ ti(￿) ￿ v￿
i (￿;0) 8￿ (IR)
where, for any (￿;q) 2 ￿ ￿ Q, v￿
i (￿;q) ￿ (￿ + ￿q) ~ qj(￿ + ￿q) ￿ ~ tj(￿ + ￿q) =
R ￿+￿q
min ~ ￿j ~ qj(s)ds + ~ Kj;
j 6= i:
24The result follows from replication arguments similar to those that lead to Theorem 2.
25This condition also implies that q
￿
i (￿) are nondecreasing, i = 1;2:
17Condition (a) guarantees that, on the equilibrium path, the mechanism ￿r￿
i assigns to each
￿ the equilibrium quantity q￿
i (￿): Condition (b) guarantees that each type ￿ ￿nds it optimal to
truthfully report to each principal the marginal valuation mi(￿) = ￿ + ￿q￿
j(￿). That each ￿ also
￿nds it optimal to participate follows from the fact that ~ Ki ￿ 0: Finally, condition (c) guarantees
that no principal has a pro￿table deviation. Instead of specifying a reaction by the agent to any
possible pair of mechanisms and then checking that, given this reaction and the mechanism o⁄ered
by the other principal, no Pi has a pro￿table deviation; the program in condition (c) gives directly
the maximal payo⁄ that each Pi can obtain given the opponent￿ s mechanism without violating
the agent￿ s rationality. To compute the payo⁄ ￿ Ui; the program in (c) uses the standard revelation
principle, taking into account that the value that each type ￿ assigns to qi is ￿qi + v￿
i (￿;qi); where
v￿
i (￿;q) denotes the maximal payo⁄ that the agent can obtain with Pj when his type is ￿ and
the quantity purchased from Pi is qi. Note that, in general, this approach is not correct: in fact,
it presumes that, when indi⁄erent, the agent follows the recommendations by Pi: Permitting the
agent to deviate from Pi￿ s recommendations can however be essential to sustain certain SCFs,
for it makes fewer deviations pro￿table. The reason why, in this particular environment, Pi can
guarantee herself the payo⁄ ￿ Ui is twofold: (i) she is not personally interested in the decisions the
agent takes with Pj and (ii) the agent￿ s payo⁄ for (qi;ti) is quasilinear and has the increasing-
di⁄erence property with respect to (￿;qi): As we show in the appendix, this implies that, given the
mechanism ￿r￿
j = (~ qj(￿);~ tj(￿)) o⁄ered by Pj; there always exists an incentive-compatible mechanism
￿r
i = (~ qi(￿);~ ti(￿)) such that, given (￿r￿
j ;￿r
i); any sequentially rational strategy ￿r
A for the agent yields
Pi a payo⁄ arbitrarily close to ￿ Ui: This explains why condition (c) is not only su¢ cient but also
necessary.
When ￿ > 0 and the function v￿
i (￿;q) is di⁄erentiable in ￿ (which is the case for example when
the schedule ~ qj(￿) is continuous), the program in condition (c) has a simple solution. The fact
that the mechanism ￿￿r
j = (~ qj(￿);~ tj(￿)) is incentive-compatible implies that the function gi(￿;q) ￿
￿q+v￿
i (￿;q)￿v￿
i (￿;0) is equi-Lipschitz continuous and di⁄erentiable in ￿, it satis￿es the increasing-
di⁄erence property, and is increasing in ￿. It follows that a pair of functions qi : ￿ ! Q; ti : ￿ ! R
satis￿es (IC) and (IR) if and only if qi(￿) is nondecreasing and, for any ￿ 2 ￿;
ti(￿) = ￿qi(￿) + [v￿




[qi(s) + ~ qj(s + ￿qi(s)) ￿ ~ qj(s)]ds ￿ Ki; (5)





hi(qi(￿);￿)dF(￿) ￿ Ki (6)
s.t. Ki ￿ 0 and qi(￿) is nondecreasing
where
hi(q;￿) ￿ ￿q + [v￿





f(￿) [q + ~ qj(￿ + ￿q) ￿ ~ qj(￿)] (7)
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Equipped with these tools, one can then establish for example the following couple of results.
Non-implementability of the collusive schedules:
It has long been noted that when two products are complements (￿ > 0), it may be impossible
to sustain the collusive schedules qc(￿) as a non-cooperative equilibrium.26 However, this result
has been established restricting the principals to o⁄er twice continuously di⁄erentiable tari⁄s, thus
leaving open the possibility that it is merely a consequence of a technical assumption.27
The approach suggested here permits one to verify that this result is true more generally.
Proposition 2 Suppose ￿ > 0: There exists no equilibrium in which the agent￿ s strategy is Markov
that sustains the collusive schedules
qi(￿) = qc(￿) 8￿; i = 1;2:
The proof uses the characterization of Proposition 1. By relying only on incentive-compatibility,
it guarantees that the aforementioned impossibility result is by no means a consequence of the
assumptions one makes on the di⁄erentiability of the tari⁄s, or on the way one extends the tari⁄s
outside the equilibrium range.
Su¢ cient conditions for the implementability of di⁄erentiable schedules.
We conclude by showing how the conditions in Proposition 1 specialize in the case of di⁄eren-
tiable schedules and can be used to construct equilibria.












f(￿) ￿ q￿(￿)(1 ￿ ￿) (8)
with boundary condition q￿(￿ ￿) = ￿ ￿=(1 ￿ ￿). Then let ~ q : ~ ￿ ￿! Q be the function de￿ned by




0 if ~ ￿ < m(￿)
q￿(m￿1(~ ￿)) if ~ ￿ 2 [m(￿);m(￿ ￿)]
q￿(￿ ￿) if ~ ￿ > m(￿ ￿);
(9)
with m(￿) ￿ ￿ + ￿q￿(￿): If, for any ￿ 2 int(￿); the function h(￿;￿) : Q ! R de￿ned by
h(q;￿) ￿ ￿q +
Z ￿+￿q
￿
~ q(~ ￿)d~ ￿ ￿ q2=2 ￿
1￿F(￿)
f(￿) [q + ~ q(￿ + ￿q) ￿ ~ q(￿)] (10)









f(￿) [q1 + q2]g:
27In the approach followed in the literature, twice di⁄erentiability is assumed to guarantee that a seller￿ s best
response can be obtained as a solution to a well-behaved optimization problem (e.g. Martimort 1992).
19is quasiconcave in q; then the schedules qi(￿) = q￿(￿); i = 1;2; can be sustained as a symmetric
pure-strategy equilibrium of ￿M in which the agent￿ s strategy is Markov.
The result in Proposition 3 thus o⁄ers a convenient two-step procedure to construct equilibrium
schedules. The ￿rst step consists in solving the di⁄erential equation given in (8). The second
step consists in checking whether the function h(￿) constructed using the solution q￿(￿) to (8) is
quasiconcave. If this is the case, the pair of schedules qi(￿) = q￿(￿); i = 1;2; is implementable.
4.2 Menu auctions
Consider now a menu auction environment a￿la Bernheim and Whinston (1985, 1986a): in these
models, the agent￿ s e⁄ort is veri￿able, preferences are common knowledge (i.e. j￿j = 1) and each
principal is restricted to o⁄er only deterministic mechanisms.28
De￿nition 3 The environment is deterministic if and only if, for any i 2 N; the set Di contains
only degenerate lotteries that assign measure one to deterministic contracts yi : E ￿! Ai.
In virtually all menu auction papers, it is customary to assume that principals make take-it-or-
leave-it o⁄ers to the agent, that is, they o⁄er a single contract yi : E ￿! Ai. Peters (2003) shows
that any equilibrium in take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers is robust; furthermore when the no-externalities
condition holds, any outcome that can be sustained with richer menus can also be sustained with
take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers. The no-externalities condition typically holds in environments in which
the principals￿decisions are monetary transfers to the agent (as in Bernheim and Whinston) and
where payo⁄s are quasi-linear in money. When instead a principal￿ s action is the selection of a
policy, or of a reward package that includes a non-monetary compensation such as the transfer of
an asset, assuming the no-externalities condition holds is restrictive. In this case, principals must
be allowed to o⁄er menus of contracts. The question is then how to identify the menus that sustain
the equilibrium outcomes.
One approach is o⁄ered by Theorem 2. A pro￿le of decisions (e￿;a￿) can then be sustained
as a pure-strategy equilibrium in which the agent￿ s strategy is Markov if and only if there exists a
pro￿le of incentive-compatible revelation mechanisms29 ￿r￿
i : Y￿i ￿! Yi, i = 1;:::;n; and a pro￿le
of contracts y￿ ￿ (y￿
1;:::;y￿
n) such that (i) ￿r￿
i (y￿
￿i) = y￿
i ; (ii) given y￿, e￿ 2 argmaxe ￿ V (e;y￿) and
y￿
i (e￿) = a￿
i, i = 1;:::;n; (iii) given any contract yi 6= y￿
i , there exists a pro￿le of contracts y￿i =
(y1;:::;yi￿1;yi+1;:::;yn) such that, for any j 2 Nnfig; yj = ￿r￿
j (y￿j￿i;yi); where y￿j￿i ￿ (yl)l6=i;j,
and a level of e⁄ort e 2 argmaxe ￿ V (e;y￿i;yi) such that ui (e;a) ￿ ui (e￿;a￿); with a = y(e) and
28See also Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), Biais, Martimort and Rochet (1997), Parlour and Rajan (2001),
and Segal and Whinston, (2003).
29Because the environment is deterministic, we ￿nd it convenient to denote the domain of ￿
r
i with Y￿i and its
codomain with Yi instead of D￿i and Di respectively.
20V (e;a) ￿ V (e0;a0) for any (e0;a0) such that there exists a y0
￿i 2 Im(￿r￿
￿i) for which a0 = y0(e0); where
y0 = (y0
￿i;yi):
This approach uses incentive-compatibility over contracts, i.e. it speci￿es a contract for the
agent as a function of the contracts o⁄ered by the other principals. An alternative and perhaps
more convenient approach is to think of the principals o⁄ering revelation mechanisms that respond
directly to the primitive actions a￿i taken by the other principals.
De￿nition 4 Let ￿ ￿r
i denote the set of mechanisms ￿ ￿
r







The idea is simple. In settings in which the no-externalities condition fails, for any given
e 2 E; the agent￿ s preferences over the contracts o⁄ered by principal i depend on the decisions a￿i
by the other principals. By implication, any menu of contracts by Pi can be conveniently described
through a mapping ￿ ￿
r
i that speci￿es, for each observable e and for each unobservable a￿i, an action
ai that is optimal for the agent among those that the agent can induce by reporting di⁄erent a0
￿i.30
We then have the following result.
Proposition 4 Let ￿ ￿r be the game in which Pi￿ s strategy space is ￿(￿ ￿r
i), i = 1;:::;n: Suppose the
environment is deterministic. A SCF ￿ can be sustained as a pure-strategy equilibrium of ￿M in
which the agent￿ s strategy is Markov if and only if it can be sustained as a pure-strategy truthful
equilibrium of ￿ ￿r.
Using the direct mechanisms of De￿nition 4, the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the
implementability of the decisions (e￿;a￿) can then be stated as follows. There exists a pro￿le of
mechanisms ￿ ￿
r￿
such that (i) a￿
i = ￿ ￿
r￿
i (e￿;a￿
￿i) with v(e￿;a￿) ￿ v(e0;a0) for any e0 2 E and any
a0 2 A such that a0
j = ￿ ￿
r￿
j (e0;^ a￿j) for some ^ a￿j 2 A￿j; (ii) for any i and any contract yi 2 Yi,
there exists a pro￿le of decisions (e;a) with ai = yi(e) and aj = ￿ ￿
r￿
j (e;a￿j) for all j 6= i such that
ui(e;a) ￿ ui(e￿;a￿) and v(e;a) ￿ v(e0;a0) for any e0 2 E and any a0 2 A such that a0
i = yi(e0) and
a0
j = ￿ ￿
r￿
i (e0;^ a￿j) for some (^ a￿j) 2 A￿j:
To illustrate how these conditions can facilitate the construction of equilibria in environments in
which the no-externalities condition fails, consider a setting with two principals where E = fe1;e2g
and Ai = [0;1]; i = 1;2: Payo⁄s are given by the following functions, where i;j = 1;2; j 6= i :
ui (e;a) =
(
ai(1 ￿ aj=2) ￿ aj if e = ei
ai(aj ￿ 1=2) ￿ aj if e = ej
v (e;a) =
(
1 + a2(2a1 ￿ 1) if e = e1
2 + a1(a2 ￿ 2) ￿ a2=2 if e = e2
30When the agent￿ s preferences are not common knowledge, these mechanisms must be replaced by ￿ ￿
r
i : E ￿A￿i ￿






v(e;ai;a￿i;￿) for any (e;a￿i;￿) 2 E ￿ A￿i ￿ ￿; where Ai(e;￿ ￿
r
i) ￿ fai : ai =
￿ ￿
r
i(e;a￿i;￿); a￿i 2 A￿i; ￿ 2 ￿g:
21One can interpret this environment as one in which a politician, or a regulator, must choose between
two policies, e1 and e2, and where two ￿rms (P1 and P2) must choose the "aggressiveness" of their
business strategies, with ai = 1 denoting the most aggressive strategy and ai = 0 the least aggressive
one. When e = ei ￿rm i has a dominant strategy in choosing ai = 1 in which case the other ￿rm
has an (iteratively) dominant strategy in choosing aj = 1: However, by behaving aggressively,
￿rms reduce their payo⁄s with respect to what they could obtain by "colluding", i.e. by playing
a1 = a2 = 0. The politician￿ s payo⁄is domestic welfare (some weighted average of consumer surplus
and domestic pro￿ts). This in turn depends on the aggressiveness of the two ￿rms￿strategies and
on the policy e: Think of policy e2 as opening the domestic market to foreign competition, while
policy e1 as protectionism. While under protectionism welfare is maximal when the two domestic
￿rms behave aggressively, the opposite is true under foreign competition.31
Notice that in this environment, condition (b) of Theorem 3 holds so that restricting attention
to Markov strategies is without loss: by implication, any pure-strategy equilibrium outcome can be
characterized as a truthful equilibrium of the revelation game.
In the lobbying game in which the two ￿rms are restricted to make take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers to
the politician (these o⁄ers specify a business strategy for each policy e), the only two pure-strategy
equilibrium outcomes are: (i) e￿ = e1 and a￿
i = 1; i = 1;2 which yields each ￿rm a payo⁄ of ￿1=2
and the policy maker a payo⁄ of 2; and (ii) e￿ = e2 and a￿
i = 1=2; i = 1;2 which yields P1 a payo⁄
of ￿1=2; P2 a payo⁄ of ￿1=8 and the policy maker a payo⁄ of 1 (the proof is in the Appendix).
When, instead, ￿rms can o⁄er menus of contracts, the following outcome can also be sustained
as an equilibrium: e￿ = e1; a￿
1 = 1=2; a￿
2 = 0. This can seen using Theorem 3 and Proposition 4.
Suppose, for example, that the principals o⁄er following mechanisms which clearly satisfy conditions





1=2 if e = e1 8a2







1 if e = e1 and a1 ￿ 1=2
0 if e = e1 and a1 < 1=2
1 if e = e2 8a1
Given these mechanisms, ￿rms induce the policy maker to choose the protectionist policy e1 while
at the same time achieving higher cooperation than under simple take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers, thus
obtaining higher total pro￿ts. The key to sustaining this outcome is to have P2 respond to the
policy e1 with a business strategy that depends on what P1 does. Because P2 cannot observe
a1 directly, such a contingency must be achieved with the compliance of the agent. A revelation
mechanism is then a convenient way of describing P2￿ s response to P1￿ s strategy that is compatible
with the agent￿ s incentives.
31There may be several explanations for this. For example, the politician may value cooperation between the two
domestic ￿rms when high consumer surplus is guaranteed by foreign supply, while it may prefer low cooperation when
the entire supply comes from the two domestic ￿rms.
224.3 Moral hazard
We now turn to environments in which the agent￿ s e⁄ort is not observable. In these environments,
a principal￿ s action consists of an incentive scheme that speci￿es a reward to the agent as a function
of some (veri￿able) performance measure that is correlated with the agent￿ s e⁄ort. Depending on
the application of interest, the reward can be a monetary payment, the transfer of an asset, the
choice of a policy, or a combination of any of the above.
At a ￿rst glance, using revelation mechanisms may appear prohibitively complex in this setting
due to the fact that the agent must report an entire array of incentive schemes to each principal.
However, as long as for any array of incentive schemes, the choice of optimal e⁄ort for the agent
is unique, things simplify signi￿cantly. Indeed, it su¢ ces to attach to each incentive scheme a
label, say an integer aj; and then simply have the agent reports an array of integers a￿i along
with his payo⁄ type ￿. In fact, because for each array of incentive schemes, the choice of e⁄ort is
unique, all players￿preferences can be expressed in reduced form directly over A: The analysis of
incentive-compatibility then proceeds in the familiar way.
To illustrate, considered the following (simpli￿ed version of a) standard moral-hazard setting.
There are two principals and two e⁄ort levels, e and ￿ e. As in Bernheim and Whinston (1986,b),
the agent￿ s preferences are common knowledge so that j￿j = 1. Each principal i must choose an
incentive scheme ai from the set Ai = fal;am;ahg, i = 1;2; where al stands for a low-power, am
for a medium-power and ah for a high-power incentive scheme.32
Instead of specifying for each player an utility function over (w;e); where w ￿ (wi)n
i=1 is an
array of rewards (e.g. monetary transfers from the principals to the agent), in the following table
we describe directly the players￿expected payo⁄s (u1;u2;v) as a function of the agent￿ s e⁄ort and
the principals￿incentive schemes.
e = e
a1na2 ah am al
ah 1 2 2 1 3 1 1 6 0
am 2 2 2 2 3 4 2 6 1
al 3 2 0 3 3 1 3 6 4
e = ￿ e
a1na2 ah am al
ah 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 3
am 5 5 5 5 5 1 5 4 0
al 6 5 2 6 5 0 6 4 0
Table 2
Note that there are no direct externalities between the principals: given e; ui(e;ai;aj) is independent
of aj; j 6= i; meaning that Pi is interested in the incentive scheme o⁄ered by Pj only because the
latter in￿ uences the agent￿ s choice over e⁄ort. Nevertheless, the no-externalities condition of Peters
32That the set of feasible incentive schemes is ￿nite in this example is clearly only to shorten the exposition. The
same logic applies to settings in which each Ai has the cardinality of the continuum; in this case, an incentive scheme
can be indexed, for example, by an integer ai 2 [0;1]:
23(2003) fails here because the agent￿ s preferences over the schemes o⁄ered by Pi depend on the
incentive scheme o⁄ered by Pj; by implication, restricting the principals to o⁄er a single incentive
scheme may preclude the possibility of sustaining certain outcomes, as we verify below.33 Also note
that payo⁄s are such that the agent prefers a high e⁄ort to a low e⁄ort if and only if at least one of
the two principals o⁄ered a high-power incentive scheme: The players￿payo⁄s (U1;U2;V ) can thus
be written in reduced form as a function of the (a1;a2) only.
a1na2 ah am al
ah 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 3
am 5 5 5 2 3 4 2 6 1
al 6 5 2 3 3 1 3 6 4
Table 3
Now suppose the principals were restricted to o⁄er a single incentive scheme to the agent. The
unique pure-strategy equilibrium outcome would be (ah;am; ￿ e) with associated expected payo⁄s
(4;5;5):
When, instead, principals are allowed to o⁄er menus of incentive schemes, the outcome (am;ah; ￿ e)
can also be sustained as a pure-strategy equilibrium outcome.34 The advantage of menus stems
from the fact that they give the agent the possibility of punishing deviations by principal j
by selecting a di⁄erent incentive scheme with principal i. Because the agent￿ s preferences over
Pi￿ s incentive schemes in turn depend on the incentive scheme selected by Pj; these menus can
be conveniently described as mappings ￿r
i : Aj ￿! Ai with the property that, for any aj;
￿r
i(aj) 2 argmaxai2Im(￿r





ah if a2 = al;am
am if a2 = ah ￿r￿
2 (a1) =
(
ah if a2 = ah;am
al if a2 = al
Given these mechanisms, it is strictly optimal for the agent to choose (am;ah) and then to select
e = ￿ e. Furthermore, given ￿r￿
￿i; it is immediate that no principal i has a pro￿table deviation, which
veri￿es that (am;ah; ￿ e) can be supported as an equilibrium.
33See Attar, Piaser and Porteiro, (2007a) and Peters (2007) for the appropriate version of the no-externalities
condition in models with non-contractable e⁄ort and Attar, Piaser, and Porteiro (2007b) for an alternative set of
conditions.
34Note that the possibility of sustaining (a
m;a
h; ￿ e) is appealing because (a
m;a
h; ￿ e) yields a Pareto improvement




Suppose now one is interested in SCFs that cannot be sustained by restricting the agent￿ s strategy
to be Markov or in SCFs that cannot be sustained by restricting the players￿strategies to be pure.
The question we address in this section is whether there exist natural ways of enriching the simple
revelation mechanisms introduced above so as to characterize such SCFs, while at the same time
avoiding the ￿in￿nite regress￿problem of universal revelation mechanisms.
First, we consider pure-strategy equilibrium outcomes sustained by non-Markov strategies.
Next, we turn to mixed-strategy equilibria.
Although the revelation mechanisms presented here are more complex than the ones considered
in the previous sections, they still permit one to conceptualize the role that the agent plays vis a
vis each of his principals thus potentially facilitating the characterization of equilibrium outcomes
in applications.
5.1 Non-Markov strategies
We ￿rst introduce a new class of revelation mechanisms that permits one to accommodate non-
Markov strategies and adjust the notion of truthful equilibria accordingly. We then prove that any
pure-strategy equilibrium outcome that can be sustained in the menu game can also be sustained
as a truthful equilibrium in the new revelation game.
De￿nition 5 (i) Let ^ ￿r denote the revelation game in which each principal￿ s strategy space is
￿(^ ￿r
i), where ^ ￿r
i is the set of revelation mechanisms ^ ￿
r
i : ^ Mr
i ! Di with message space ^ Mr
i ￿
￿ ￿ D￿i ￿ N￿i with N￿i ￿ Nnfig [ f0g, such that Im(^ ￿
r
i) is compact and, for any (￿;￿￿i;k) 2
￿ ￿ D￿i ￿ N￿i;
^ ￿
r





(ii) Given a pro￿le of mechanisms ^ ￿
r
2 ^ ￿r, the agent￿ s strategy is truthful in ^ ￿
r
i if and only if,
for any ￿ 2 ￿ and any (^ mr
i; ^ mr




i = (￿;(^ ￿
r
j(^ mr
j))j6=i;k), for some k 2 N￿i:
An equilibrium strategy pro￿le ￿r￿ 2 E(^ ￿r) is a truthful equilibrium if and only if, given any pro￿le
of mechanisms ^ ￿
r
such that jfj 2 N : ^ ￿
r
j = 2 Supp[￿r￿




i ] with k = 0 if ^ ￿
r
j 2 Supp[￿r￿
j ] for all j 2 N and k = l if ^ ￿
r
j 2 Supp[￿r￿
j ] for all j 6= l
and ^ ￿
r
l = 2 Supp[￿r￿
l ] for some l 2 N:
The interpretation is that the agent is now asked to report to each Pi the identity k 2 N￿i of
a deviating principal, in addition to (￿;￿￿i), with k = 0 in the absence of any deviation. Because
25the identity of a deviating principal is not payo⁄-relevant, a revelation mechanism ^ ￿
r
i is incentive-
compatible only if, for any (￿;￿￿i) 2 ￿ ￿ D￿i and any k;k0 2 N￿i; V (￿r
i(￿;￿￿i;k);￿;￿￿i) =
V (￿r
i(￿;￿￿i;k0);￿;￿￿i): As we show below, allowing a principal￿ s response to (￿;￿￿i) to depend on
the identity of a deviating principal may be essential to sustain certain outcomes when the agent￿ s
strategy is not Markov.
An equilibrium strategy pro￿le is then said to be a truthful equilibrium of the new revelation
game ^ ￿r if, whenever no more than one principal deviated from equilibrium play, the agent truthfully
reports to any of the non-deviating principals his true type ￿; the decisions he is inducing with the
other principals, and the identity k of the deviating principal. We then have the following result.
Theorem 5 Any SCF ￿ that can be sustained as a pure-strategy equilibrium of ￿M can also be sus-
tained as a pure-strategy truthful equilibrium of ^ ￿r. Furthermore, any SCF ￿ that can be sustained
as an equilibrium of ^ ￿r can also be sustained as an equilibrium of ￿M.
Consider the"only if" part of the result (the "if" part follows from essentially the same ar-
guments as in the proof of Theorem 2).35 The key step in the proof consists in showing that if
the SCF ￿ can be sustained as a pure-strategy equilibrium of ￿M; it can also be sustained by a
continuation equilibrium ￿M￿
A with the following property. For any k 2 N; ￿ 2 ￿ and ￿k 2 Dk,
there exists a unique pro￿le of decisions ￿￿k(￿;￿k) 2 D￿k such that A always selects ￿￿k(￿;￿k) with
all principals other than k when his type is ￿, the decision A induces with Pk is ￿k, and k is the only
deviating principal. In other words, the decisions that the agent induces with the non-deviating
principals depend on the decision ￿k of the deviating principal but not on the menus o⁄ered by the
latter. The decisions ￿￿k(￿;￿k) belong to those that minimize the payo⁄ of the deviating principal
Pk among those in the equilibrium menus of the non-deviating principals that are optimal for type
￿ given ￿k. The rest of the proof then follows quite naturally. When the agent reports to Pi that
no deviation occurred￿ i.e. when he reports that his type is ￿; that the decisions he is inducing
with the other principals are ￿￿
￿i(￿) and that k = 0￿ the revelation mechanism ^ ￿
r￿
i responds with
the equilibrium decision ￿￿
i(￿): When instead, the agent reports that principal k deviated and that,
as a result, the agent is inducing the decision ￿k with Pk and the decisions (￿j(￿;￿k))j6=i;k with
the other principals, the mechanism ￿r￿
i responds with the decision ￿i(￿;￿k) that, together with
(￿j(￿;￿k))j6=i;k, minimizes the payo⁄ of the deviating principal Pk.36 Given the equilibrium mech-
anisms ^ ￿
r￿
￿k; following a truthful strategy is clearly optimal for the agent. Furthermore, given ^ ￿r￿
A ,
a principal Pk who expects all other principals to o⁄er the equilibrium mechanisms ^ ￿
r￿
￿k cannot do
better than o⁄ering the equilibrium mechanism ^ ￿
r￿
i herself. We conclude that if the SCF ￿ can be
35Note that in general ^ ￿
r is not an enlargement of ￿
M (certain menus in ￿
M may not be available in ￿
r); nor is
￿
M an enlargement of ^ ￿
r (the same menu can be o⁄ered through multiple revelation mechanisms).
36This is only a partial description of the equilibrium mechanisms ^ ￿
r￿
and of the continuation equilibrium ￿
r￿
A :
The complete description is in the appendix.
26sustained as a pure-strategy equilibrium of ￿M it can also be sustained as a pure-strategy truthful
equilibrium of ^ ￿r.
To see why, with non-Markov strategies, it may be essential to condition a principal￿ s response
to (￿;￿￿i) on the identity of a deviating principal, consider the following example where n = 3,




t 1 4 4 5 1 5 0 4
m 1 1 1 0 1 5 1 0
b 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
a3 = d
a1na2 l r
t 1 0 5 4 1 1 1 3
m 1 1 1 0 1 0 5 5
b 1 1 5 0 1 5 0 5
Table 3
For simplicity, assume that lotteries over contracts are not feasible and that only deterministic
contracts can be o⁄ered: because there is no e⁄ort, a menu of deterministic contracts for each
Pi then consists of a subset of Ai. The outcome (t;l;s) can then be sustained as a pure-strategy
equilibrium of the menu game ￿M. The equilibrium features each Pi o⁄ering the entire menu Ai:
Given the equilibrium menus, the agent chooses (t;l;s): Any deviation by P2 to the (degenerate)
menu frg is punished by the agent choosing m with P1 and d with P3; whereas any deviation by
P3 to the degenerate menu fdg is punished by the agent choosing b with P1 and r with P2: This
strategy for the agent is clearly non-Markov: given the same actions (a2;a3) = (r;d) with P2 and
P3; the agent chooses di⁄erent actions with P1 as a function of the particular menus o⁄ered by
P2 and P3. This behavior is essential to sustain the equilibrium outcome. By implication, (t;l;s)
cannot be sustained as an equilibrium of the revelation game ￿r in which the principals o⁄er the
simple mechanisms ￿r
i : A￿i ! Ai considered in the previous sections.37The outcome (t;l;s) can
however be sustained as a truthful equilibrium of the more general revelation game ^ ￿r in which
the agent reports the identity of the deviating principal in addition to the payo⁄-relevant decisions
a￿i.38
37In fact, any incentive-compatible mechanism ￿
r
1 that permits the agent to induce the equilibrium decision t must
satisfy ￿
r
i(a2;a3) = t for any (a2;a3) 6= (r;d); this is because the agent strictly prefers t to both m and b for any
(a2;a3) 6= (r;d): It follows that any such mechanism either fails to provide the agent with the decision m that is
necessary to punish a deviation by P2 or the decision b that is necessary to punish a deviation by P3:
38Consistently with the result in Theorem 3, note that the problems with simple revelation mechansims ￿
r
i : A￿i !
Ai emerge in this example only because (i) the agent is indi⁄erent about P1￿ s response to (a2;a3) = (r;d) so that
he can be induced to choose di⁄erent decisions with P1 as a function of whether it is P2 or P3 who deviated from
equilibrium play; (ii) the principals￿payo⁄s are su¢ ciently asymmetric so that the decision the agent induces with
P1 to punish a deviation by P2 cannot be the same as the one he induces to punish a deviation by P3:
275.2 Mixed strategies
We now turn to equilibria in which the principals randomize over their mechanisms and/or the
agent randomizes over the reports he sends to the principals.39
The reason why the simple mechanisms considered in Section 3 may fail to sustain certain
mixed-strategy outcomes is that they do not permit the agent to induce di⁄erent decisions with
the same principal in response to the same decisions ￿￿i he is inducing with the other principals.
To illustrate, consider the following example in which j￿j = jEj = 1; n = 2; A1 = ft;bg and
A2 = fl;rg, and where payo⁄s, (u1;u2;v) are as in the following table:
a1na2 l r
t 2 1 1 1 0 1
b 1 0 1 1 2 0
Table 4
Assume that Di contains only degenerate lotteries over Ai. The following is then an equilibrium
in the menu game. Each principal o⁄ers the menu ￿M￿
i whose image is the entire set Ai: Given
the equilibrium menus, the agent selects with equal probabilities the decisions (t;l); (b;l) and
(t;r): Note that it is essential that Di contains only degenerate lotteries. If P1 could o⁄er non-
degenerate lotteries, she could do better by deviating and o⁄er the lottery that gives t and b
with equal probabilities. In this case, A would strictly prefer to induce l with P2 thus giving P1
a higher payo⁄. As anticipated in the introduction, we see this as a serious limitation on what
can be implemented with mixed strategy equilibria: when neither the agent￿ s nor the principals￿
preferences are ￿ at (i.e. constant over E ￿A) and when all lotteries are feasible, it is very di¢ cult
to construct examples where the agent is indi⁄erent over the lotteries o⁄ered by the principals (so
that he can be induced to randomize) and, at the same time, no principal can bene￿t by breaking
the agent￿ s indi⁄erence by o⁄ering a di⁄erent menu so as to induce the agent to choose only those
lotteries that are more favorable to her.
Having said this, it is important to note that, while certain SCFs may not be sustained with
the simple revelation mechanisms ￿r
i : D￿i ￿! Di of the previous sections, any SCF that can
be sustained as a mixed strategy equilibrium in the menu game can also be sustained as a truth-
ful equilibrium of an enriched revelation game in which the principals o⁄er set-valued revelation
39Recall that the notion of pure-strategy equilibria given in De￿nition 1 allows the agent to mix over e⁄ort.
28mechanisms ~ ￿
r
i : ￿ ￿ D￿i ￿! 2Di such that, for any (￿;￿￿i) 2 ￿ ￿ D￿i;40
~ ￿
r





The interpretation is that the agent ￿rst reports his type along with the decisions ￿￿i that he
is inducing with the other principals (possibly by mixing, or in response to a mixed strategy by
one of the other principals); the mechanism then responds by giving the agent the decisions in ~ ￿
r
i
that are optimal for type ￿ given ￿￿i; ￿nally, the agent selects a decision from the set ~ ￿
r
i(￿;￿￿i)
and this decision is implemented. In the example above, the equilibrium SCF can be sustained by
having P1 o⁄er the mechanism ~ ￿
r￿
1 (l) = ft;bg; ~ ￿
r￿
1 (r) = ftg; and P2 the mechanism ~ ￿
r￿
2 (t) = fl;rg;
~ ￿
r￿
2 (b) = flg. Given the equilibrium mechanisms, with probability 1=3, the agent induces the
decisions (t;l) by reporting l truthfully to P1 and then choosing t from ~ ￿
r￿
1 (l) and by reporting t
truthfully to P2 and then choosing l from ~ ￿
r￿
2 (t), and so on. The equilibrium is truthful in the
sense that the agent may well randomize over the decisions he is inducing with the principals, but
once he has decided which decisions he wants to induce (i.e. for any given realization of his mixed
strategy), he always reports these decisions truthfully to each principal.
Now note that, although a revelation mechanism is conveniently described by the correspon-
dence ~ ￿
r




i ! Di with message space ~ Mr









i 2 ~ ￿
r
i(￿;￿￿i) otherwise.
These mechanisms are clearly incentive-compatible in the sense that, given (￿;￿￿i), the agent
(weakly) prefers any decision in ~ ￿
r
i(￿;￿￿i) to any decision that can be obtained by reporting (￿0;￿0
￿i).
Furthermore, given any pro￿le of mechanisms ~ ￿
r
; the decisions that are optimal for each type ￿
always belong to those that can be obtained by reporting truthfully to each principal.
De￿nition 6 Let ~ ￿r denote the revelation game in which each principal￿ s strategy space is ￿(~ ￿r
i),
where ~ ￿r
i is the class of set-valued incentive-compatible revelation mechanisms de￿ned above. Given
a mechanism ~ ￿
r
i 2 ~ ￿r
i; the agent￿ s strategy is truthful in ~ ￿
r
i if and only if, for any ~ ￿
r
￿i 2 ~ ￿r
￿i, ￿ 2 ￿
















40With an abuse of notation, in the sequel, we denote by 2
Di the power set of Di, with the exclusion of the empty
set.
For any set-valued mapping f : Mi ! 2
Di, we then let Im(f) ￿ f￿i 2 Di : 9 mi 2 Mi s.t. ￿i 2 f(mi)g denote the
range of f:
41The particular decision ￿
0
i associated to the message m
r
i = (￿;￿￿i;￿i), with ￿i = 2 ~ ￿
r
i(￿￿i;￿) is not important: the
agent never ￿nds it optimal to choose any such message.
29An equilibrium strategy pro￿le ~ ￿r 2 E(~ ￿r) is a truthful equilibrium if ~ ￿r
A is truthful in every ~ ￿
r
i 2 ~ ￿r
i
for any i 2 N.
The agent￿ s strategy is truthful in ~ ￿
r
i if the message ~ mr
i = (￿;￿￿i;￿i) the agent sends to principal









other principals by sending the messages ~ mr
￿i and the true decision ￿i = ￿ ￿
r
i(~ mr
i) that A induces
with Pi by sending the message ~ mr
i. We then have the following result.
Theorem 6 A SCF ￿ : ￿ ￿! ￿(E ￿ A) can be sustained as an equilibrium of ￿M if and only if
it can be sustained as a truthful equilibrium of ~ ￿r.
The proof is similar to the one that establishes the Menu Theorems and is thus con￿ned to
the Supplementary Material. The reason why the result does not follow directly from the Menu
Theorems is that ~ ￿r is not an enlargement of ￿M: In fact, the menus in the range of the revelation
mechanisms in ~ ￿r are only those that have the following property: for each ￿i in the menu there
exists a (￿;￿￿i) such that, given (￿;￿￿i), ￿i is as good for the agent as any other decision in the
menu.42
That the principals can be restricted to o⁄er menus that have this property is not surprising;
the proof however requires some work to show how the agent￿ s and the principals￿mixed strategies
can be adjusted to preserve the same distribution over outcomes as in the original unrestricted menu
game ￿M: The value of Theorem 6 is however not in re￿ning the existing Menu Theorems but in
providing a convenient way of describing which decisions the agent ￿nds it optimal to induce as a
function of the decisions he induces with the other principals; this can facilitate the construction
of the equilibrium outcomes in applications in which mixing plays a role.
6 Conclusions
We have shown how the equilibrium outcomes that are typically of interest in common agency
games (those sustained by pure-strategy pro￿les in which the agent￿ s behavior is Markov) can be
conveniently characterized by having the principals o⁄ering revelation mechanisms in which the
agent truthfully reports his type along with the decisions he is inducing with the other principals.
As compared to universal mechanisms, the approach proposed here has the advantage that
it does not lead to the in￿nite regress problem, for it does not require the agent to describe the
mechanisms o⁄ered by other principals.
42These menus are also di⁄erent from the menus of undominated decisions considered in Martimort and Stole
(2002). A menu for principal i is said to contain a dominated decision, say ￿i, if there exists another decision ￿
0
i in
the menu such that, whatever the decisions ￿￿i of the other principals, the agent￿ s payo⁄ under ￿
0
i is strictly higher
than under ￿i.
30As compared to the Menu Theorems, our results o⁄er a convenient way of describing how the
agent chooses from a menu as a function of ￿who he is￿(his exogenous type) and ￿what he is doing￿
with the other principals (the decisions he induces in the other relationships). The advantage of
describing the agent￿ s choices from a menu through revelation mechanisms comes from the fact
that this often facilitates the characterization of the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the
sustainability of outcomes as common agency equilibria. We have illustrated such a possibility in
a few cases of interest: menu auctions, moral hazard settings, and competition in non-linear tari⁄s
with adverse selection.
We have also shown how the simple revelation mechanisms described above can be enriched
(albeit at the cost of an increase in complexity) to characterize also outcomes sustained by non-
Markov strategies and/or mixed strategy equilibria.
Throughout the analysis, we have maintained the assumption of a single agent. The idea of
having each agent truthfully reporting a pro￿le of payo⁄-relevant decisions in addition to his private
information seems however promising also in environments with multiple agents (see, for example,
Yamashita, 2007, for an exploration in this direction).
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2. Part 1. We prove that if there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium
￿M￿
of ￿M in which the agent￿ s strategy is Markov and that implements ￿; then there also exists
a truthful pure-strategy equilibrium ￿r￿ of ￿r that implements the same SCF.
Let ￿M￿ and ￿M￿
A denote respectively the equilibrium menus and the continuation equilibrium
that support ￿ in ￿M. Because ￿M￿
A is Markov, then for any i and any (￿;￿￿i;￿M
i ) there exists a
unique decision ￿i(￿;￿￿i;￿M
i ) 2 Im(￿M
i ) such that A always induces ￿i(￿;￿￿i;￿M
i ) with Pi when
the latter o⁄ers the menu ￿M
i ; the agent￿ s type is ￿, and the decisions A induces with the other
principals are ￿￿i: Finally let ￿￿(￿) = (￿￿
i(￿))n
i=1 denote the equilibrium decisions that type ￿ induces
in ￿M when all principals o⁄er the equilibrium menus, i.e., when ￿M = (￿M￿
i )n
i=1:
Now consider the following strategy pro￿le ￿r￿ for the revelation game ￿r. Each principal i;
i 2 N, o⁄ers the mechanism ￿r￿
i such that
￿r￿
i (￿;￿￿i) = ￿i(￿;￿￿i;￿M￿
i ) 8 (￿;￿￿i) 2 ￿ ￿ D￿i:
The agent￿ s strategy ￿r￿
A is such that, when ￿r = (￿r￿
i )n
i=1; then each type ￿ reports to each
principal i the message mr
i = (￿;￿￿
￿i(￿)) thus inducing the equilibrium decision ￿￿
i(￿) with each
principal. Given the contracts y; then each type ￿ induces the same distribution over e⁄ort he
would have induced in ￿M had the contracts pro￿le been y, the menus pro￿le been ￿M￿, and the
lotteries pro￿le been ￿￿(￿):
31If, instead, ￿r is such that ￿r
j = ￿r￿
j for all j 6= i whereas ￿r
i 6= ￿r￿
i , then each type ￿ induces




i is the menu whose image is Im(￿M
i ) = Im(￿r
i): That is, let ￿(￿;￿M) denote the decisions
that type ￿ would have induced in ￿M given ￿M: Then given ￿r, A induces the decision ￿i(￿;￿M)
with the deviating principal Pi and then reports to each non-deviating principal Pj the message
mr
j = (￿;￿￿j(￿;￿M)) thus inducing the same decisions ￿(￿;￿M) as in ￿M. In the continuation game
that starts after the contracts y are realized, A then induces the same distribution over e⁄ort he
would have induced in ￿M given the contracts y; the menus ￿M and the decisions ￿(￿;￿M):
Finally, given any pro￿le of mechanisms ￿r such that jfj 2 N : ￿r
j 6= ￿r￿
j gj > 1; the strategy
￿r￿
A prescribes that A induces the same outcomes he would have induced in ￿M given ￿M, where
￿M is the pro￿le of menus such that Im(￿M
i ) = Im(￿r
i) for all i:
The strategy ￿r￿
A described above is clearly a truthful strategy. The optimality of such a
strategy in ￿r then follows directly from the optimality of the agent￿ s strategy ￿M￿
A in ￿M together
with the fact that Im(￿r￿
i ) ￿ Im(￿M￿
i ) for all i:
Given the continuation equilibrium ￿r￿
A it is then immediate that any principal Pi who expects
all other principals Pj; j 6= i, to o⁄er the mechanisms ￿r￿
￿i cannot do better than o⁄ering the
equilibrium mechanism ￿r￿
i : We conclude that the pure-strategy pro￿le ￿r￿ constructed above is an
equilibrium of ￿r and sustains the same SCF ￿ as the equilibrium ￿M￿ of ￿M:
Part 2. We now prove the converse: if there exists an equilibrium ￿r￿ of ￿r that sustains the
SCF ￿; then there also exists an equilibrium ￿M￿ of ￿M that sustains the same SCF.
First, consider the principals. For any i 2 N and any ￿M
i 2 ￿M
i ; let ￿r
i(￿M









i ) may well be empty). The strategy ￿M￿
i 2 ￿(￿M
i ) for Pi in ￿M is then such that, for any
set of menus B ￿ ￿M
i
￿M￿








Next, consider the agent.
Case 1. Given any pro￿le of menus ￿M 2 ￿M such that, for any i 2 N; ￿r
i(￿M
i ) 6= ?; the
strategy ￿M￿
A induces the same distribution over A ￿ E as the strategy ￿r￿
A in ￿r given the event




i ): Precisely, let ￿￿r￿
A : ￿ ￿ ￿r ! ￿(A ￿ E) denote the distribution
over outcomes induced by the strategy ￿r￿
A in ￿r: Then, for any ￿ 2 ￿; ￿M￿















where, for any i; ￿r￿
i (￿j￿r
i(￿M
i )) denotes the regular conditional probability distribution over ￿r
i
generated by the original strategy ￿r￿
i conditioning on ￿r
i belonging to ￿r
i(￿M
i ):
Case 2. If, instead, ￿M is such that there exists a j 2 N such that ￿r
i(￿M
i ) 6= ? for all i 6= j
32while ￿r
j(￿M
j ) = ?, then let ￿r
j be any arbitrary revelation mechanism such that
￿r
j(￿;￿￿j) 2 arg max
￿j2Im(￿M
j )
V (￿j;￿￿j;￿) 8(￿;￿￿j) 2 ￿ ￿ D￿j:
The strategy ￿M￿
A then induces the same outcomes as the strategy ￿r￿
A given ￿r


























Case 3. Finally, for any ￿M such that jfj 2 N : ￿r
j(￿M
j ) = ?j > 1, simply let ￿M￿
A (￿;￿M) be
any strategy that is sequentially optimal for A given (￿;￿M).
The fact that ￿r￿
A was a continuation equilibrium for ￿r guarantees that the strategy ￿M￿
A
constructed above is a continuation equilibrium for ￿M. Furthermore, given ￿M￿
A ; any principal
Pi who expects any other principal Pj, j 6= i, to follow the strategy ￿M￿
i cannot do better than
following the strategy ￿M￿
i . We conclude that the strategy pro￿le ￿M￿ constructed above is an
equilibrium of ￿M and sustains the same outcomes as ￿r￿ in ￿r:
Proof of Theorem 3. When (a) holds, the result is immediate. In what follows we prove
that when (b) holds, then if the SCF ￿ can be sustained as a pure-strategy equilibrium ￿M￿ of
￿M, it can also be sustained as a pure-strategy equilibrium ^ ￿M in which the agent￿ s strategy ^ ￿M
A
is Markov.
Let ￿M￿ denote the equilibrium menus under the strategy pro￿le ￿M￿ and ￿￿ denote the
equilibrium decisions that are implemented when all principals o⁄er the equilibrium menus ￿M￿.
Suppose that ￿M￿









￿i such that A selects (￿i;￿0
￿i) when ￿M = (~ ￿
M
i ;￿M
￿i) and (￿ ￿i;￿0
￿i)
when ￿M = (~ ￿
M
i ; ￿ ￿
M
￿i); with ￿i 6= ￿ ￿i: We then show that, starting from ￿M￿
A ; one can construct a
Markov continuation equilibrium ^ ￿M
A that induces all principals to continue to o⁄er the equilibrium
menus ￿M￿ and that sustains the same equilibrium decisions ￿￿ as ￿M￿
A :





￿i. Let then ^ ￿M
A be the strategy
that coincides with ￿M￿





i ; ￿ ￿
M
￿i) and that prescribes that A selects ￿￿
both when ￿M = (~ ￿
M
i ;￿M
￿i) and when ￿M = (~ ￿
M
i ; ￿ ￿
M
￿i). In the continuation game that starts after
the lotteries ￿￿ select the contracts y; ^ ￿M
A prescribes that A induces the same distribution over
e⁄ort he would have induced according to the original strategy ￿M￿
A as if the menus o⁄ered had
been ￿M￿. It is immediate that the strategy ^ ￿M
A is sequentially rational for the agent. It is also
immediate that, given ^ ￿M
A , any principal Pj who expects any other principal Pl, l 6= j, to o⁄er the
equilibrium menu ￿M￿
l cannot do better than o⁄ering the equilibrium menu ￿M￿
j :









￿i are necessarily di⁄erent from ￿M￿
￿i ): Let ^ ￿M
A be the strategy that coincides with ￿M￿
A for all





i ; ￿ ￿
M
￿i) and that prescribes that A selects (￿0
i;￿0




and when ￿M = (~ ￿
M






i ) V (￿i;￿0




￿i) ￿ Uj(^ ￿i;￿0






By the Uniform Punishment condition, such a decision always exists: In the continuation game that
starts after the lotteries ￿ = (￿0
i;￿0
￿i) select the contracts y; A then selects e⁄ort ￿k(y), where
k 2 fj 2 Nnfig : ￿M
j 6= ￿M￿
j g
is identity of one of the principals who deviated from equilibrium play, whereas ￿k(y) is the level of
e⁄ort de￿ned in (2). Clearly, when
￿ ￿fj 2 Nnfig : ￿M
j 6= ￿M￿
j g
￿ ￿ > 1; the identity k of the deviating
principal can be chosen arbitrarily. Once again, it is immediate that the strategy ^ ￿M
A is sequentially
rational for the agent and that, given ^ ￿M
A , any principal Pj who expects any other principal Pl,
l 6= j, to o⁄er the equilibrium menu ￿M￿
l cannot do better than o⁄ering the equilibrium menu ￿M￿
l :
Case 3. Lastly, consider the case that ~ ￿
M
i 6= ￿M￿





￿i; let ^ ￿M
A be the strategy that coincides with ￿M￿





i ; ￿ ￿
M
￿i) and
that prescribes that A selects (￿0
i;￿0
￿i) both when ￿M = (~ ￿
M
i ;￿M
￿i) and when ￿M = (~ ￿
M







i ) V (￿i;￿0



















A is trivially sequentially rational for the agent and, given ^ ￿M
A , no principal has an incentive
to deviate.
Note that the strategy ^ ￿M
A constructed from ￿M￿
A using the procedure described above has the
property that, given any ￿M 2 ￿M such that ￿M
i 6= ~ ￿
M
i the behavior speci￿ed by ^ ￿M
A is the same as
that speci￿ed by the original strategy ￿M￿
A : Furthermore, for any ￿M 2 ￿M; the decision the agent
takes with any principal Pj, j 6= i; is the same as under the original strategy ￿M￿
A : This implies that
the procedure described above can be iterated for all i 2 N and all ~ ￿
M
i 2 ￿M
i ; this gives a strategy
for the agent that is Markov and that induces all principals to continue to o⁄er the equilibrium
mechanisms.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof follows from applying the same steps indicated in the proof
of Theorem 3 to all ￿ 2 ￿ and by noting that, when ￿M￿
A satis￿es the "Conformity to Equilibrium"




￿i such that some
type ￿ 2 ￿ selects (￿i;￿￿
￿i(￿)) when ￿M = (￿M￿
i ;￿M
￿i) and (￿ ￿i;￿￿
￿i(￿)) when ￿M = (￿M￿
i ; ￿ ￿
M
￿i);
with ￿i 6= ￿ ￿i: In other words, Case 1 in the proof of Theorem 3 never arises when the strategy
￿M￿
A satis￿es the "Conformity to Equilibrium" condition. This in turn guarantees that when one
34replaces the original strategy ￿M￿
A with the strategy ^ ￿M
A that is obtained from ￿M￿
A iterating the
steps in the proof of Theorem 3 for all ￿ 2 ￿; all i 2 N, and all ~ ￿
M
i 2 ￿M
i , it remains optimal for
each Pi to o⁄er the equilibrium menu ￿M￿
i :
Proof of Proposition 1. It is immediate that conditions (a)-(c) guarantee existence of a
truthful equilibrium in the revelation game ￿r sustaining the schedules q￿
i (￿); i = 1;2: Theorem 2
then implies that the same schedules can also be sustained in the menu game ￿M.
Thus consider the necessity of these conditions. That conditions (a) and (b) are necessary
follows directly from Theorem 2: If the schedules q￿
i (￿), i = 1;2; can be sustained as a pure-strategy
equilibrium of ￿M in which the agent￿ s strategy is Markov, then they can also be sustained as a
pure-strategy truthful equilibrium of ￿r. As discussed in the main text, the same schedules can then
also be sustained by a truthful (pure-strategy) equilibrium in which the mechanism o⁄ered by each




j) whenever ￿+￿qj = ￿0+￿q0
j: The de￿nition of such
an equilibrium then implies that there must exist a pair of mechanisms ￿r￿
i = (~ qi(￿);~ ti(￿)); i = 1;2;
such that ~ qi(￿) is nondecreasing, ~ ti(￿) satis￿es (3), and conditions (a) and (b) in the proposition
hold.
It remains to show that condition (c) is also necessary. To see this, ￿rst note that if there exists
a pair of mechanisms (~ qi(￿);~ ti(￿))i=1;2 and a truthful continuation equilibrium ￿r
A that sustain the
schedules q￿
i (￿); i = 1;2; then this means that the schedules q￿
i (￿) and t￿
i(￿) ￿ ~ ti(mi(￿)), i = 1;2;
must satisfy the equivalent of the (IC) and (IR) constraints in the program of condition (c); this
in turn means that necessarily U￿
i ￿ ￿ Ui, i = 1;2: To prove the result it then su¢ ces to show that
if U￿
i < ￿ Ui; then Pi has a pro￿table deviation. This can be shown by contradiction. Suppose there
exists a truthful equilibrium ￿r 2 E(￿r) sustaining the schedules (q￿
i (￿))i=1;2 and such that U￿
i < ￿ Ui,
for some i 2 N. Then there also exists a (pure-strategy) equilibrium ￿M￿ 2 E(￿M) sustaining the
same schedules and such that (i) each Pi o⁄ers the menu ￿M￿
i de￿ned by Im(￿M￿
i ) = Im(￿r￿
i ) and
(ii) each type ￿ selects the pair (q￿
i (￿);t￿
i(￿)) from each menu ￿M￿
i , thus yielding Pi a payo⁄ U￿
i
(see the proof of part 2 of Theorem 2). We then show that, irrespective of which continuation
equilibrium ￿r￿
A one considers, Pi has a pro￿table deviation.
Case 1. Suppose that the schedules qi(￿) and ti(￿) that solve the program of condition (c) are
such that the (IC) and (IR) constraints hold as strict inequalities for almost all ￿: This immediately
implies that if in ￿M Pi deviates and o⁄ers the menu ￿M
i de￿ned by Im(￿M
i ) = f(qi(￿);ti(￿)) :
￿ 2 ￿g then in any continuation equilibrium, almost every type ￿ will necessarily select the pair
(qi(￿);ti(￿)) from ￿M
i ; thus giving Pi a payo⁄ ￿ Ui > U￿
i .43
43Note that, while almost every ￿ 2 ￿ strictly prefers (qi(￿);ti(￿)) to any other pair (qi;pi) 2 Im(￿
M
i ); there
may exist a positive-measure set of types ￿
0 who, given (qi(￿
0);ti(￿





0)) with Pj or inducing another decision (qj;tj) 2 Im(￿
M￿
j ): The fact that Pi is not
personally interested in (qj;tj) however implies that Pi￿ s deviation to ￿
M
i is pro￿table irrespective of how one speci￿es
35Case 2. Next suppose that the schedules qi(￿) and ti(￿) that solve the program of condition
(c) are such that the (IC) constraints hold as strict inequalities for almost all ￿; but there exists
a positive-measure set of types ￿0 ￿ ￿ such that, for any ￿0 2 ￿0 the (IR) constraint holds as an
equality. In this case, a deviation to the menu ￿M
i of Case 1 need not be pro￿table for Pi, for
each type ￿0 2 ￿0 could react by choosing not to participate. However, if this is the case, then Pi
could o⁄er another menu ￿M0
i such that Im(￿M0
i ) = f(q0
i(￿);t0
i(￿)) : ￿ 2 ￿g; with q0
i(￿) = qi(￿) and
t0
i(￿) = ti(￿) ￿ " for all ￿ 2 ￿; with " > 0. Clearly such a menu guarantees participation by all
types. By choosing " arbitrarily close to zero, Pi can then guarantee herself a payo⁄ arbitrarily
close to ￿ Ui and thus strictly higher than U￿
i ; once again a contradiction.
Case 3. Finally, let Vi(￿;￿0) ￿ ￿qi(￿0) + v￿
i (￿;qi(￿0)) ￿ ti(￿0) denote the payo⁄ that type ￿
obtains by selecting the pair (qi(￿0);ti(￿0)) designed by Pi for type ￿0 and then selecting the pair
(~ qj(￿ + ￿qi(￿0));~ tj(￿ + ￿qi(￿0)) with Pj, where qi(￿) and ti(￿) are again the schedules that solve the
program of condition (c). Now suppose there exists a positive-measure set of types ￿0 ￿ ￿ such
that for any ￿ 2 ￿0, there exists a ￿0 2 ￿ such that
Vi(￿;￿) = Vi(￿;￿0)
with qi(￿0) 6= qi(￿),44 whereas for any ￿ 2 ￿n￿0;
Vi(￿;￿) > Vi(￿;^ ￿) for any ^ ￿ 2 ￿ such that qi(^ ￿) 6= qi(￿):
The set ￿0 thus corresponds to the set of types ￿ for whom the pair (qi(￿);ti(￿)) is not strictly
optimal, in the sense that there exists another pair (qi(￿0);ti(￿0)) with (qi(￿0);ti(￿0)) 6= (qi(￿);ti(￿))
that is as good for type ￿ as the pair (qi(￿);ti(￿)):
Without loss, assume that qi(￿) and ti(￿) are such that each type ￿ 2 ￿ strictly prefers the
pair (qi(￿);ti(￿)) to the null contract (0;0) (as shown in Case 2 above, Pi can always adjust the
original transfer schedule ti(￿) so as to guarantee that this property holds, while preserving incentive
compatibility for all types and still obtaining a payo⁄ Ui > U￿
i ).
Now let z : ￿ ￿ 2￿ be the correspondence de￿ned by
z(￿) = f￿0 2 ￿; ￿0 6= ￿ : Vi(￿;￿) = Vi(￿;￿0) and qi(￿0) 6= qi(￿)g 8￿ 2 ￿
and then let z(￿) ￿ Im(z) denote the range of z(￿): In words, this correspondence maps each type
￿ 2 ￿ into the set of types ￿0 6= ￿ that receive a contract (qi(￿0);ti(￿0)) di⁄erent from the one
(qi(￿);ti(￿)) designed for type ￿ but that nonetheless give type ￿ the same payo⁄ as the contract
(qi(￿);ti(￿)):
the agent￿ s choice with Pj:
44Cearly if qi(￿) = qi(￿
0), which also implies that ti(￿) = ti(￿
0); then whether type ￿ selects the contract designed
for him or that designed for type ￿
0 is inconsequential for Pi￿ s payo⁄.
36Finally, let g : ￿ ￿ 2￿ denote the correspondence de￿ned by
g(￿) = f￿0 2 ￿; ￿0 6= ￿ : (qi(￿0);ti(￿0)) = (qi(￿);ti(￿))g 8￿ 2 ￿:
This correspondence maps each type ￿ into the set of types ￿0 6= ￿ that, given the schedules
(qi(￿);ti(￿)); receive the same price-quantity pair as type ￿: Then, given any set ￿0 ￿ ￿; let
g(￿0) ￿ f
S
g(￿) : ￿ 2 ￿0g
Starting from the schedules qi(￿) and ti(￿); then let q0
i(￿) and t0
i(￿) be a new pair of schedules
such that q0
i(￿) = qi(￿) for all ￿ 2 ￿; t0
i(￿) = ti(￿) for all ￿ = 2 ￿0[g(￿0) while for any ￿ 2 ￿0[g(￿0),
t0
i(￿) = ti(￿) ￿ " with " > 0. Clearly, if " is chosen su¢ ciently small, then the new schedules q0
i(￿)
and t0
i(￿) necessarily satisfy the (IC) and (IR) constraints in the program of condition (c) for all ￿:
Now suppose that the original schedules qi(￿) and ti(￿) were such that f￿0 [ g(￿0)g \ z(￿) =
?. Then the new schedules q0
i(￿) and t0
i(￿) guarantee that each type ￿ 2 ￿ now strictly prefers
the contract (q0
i(￿);t0





This in turn implies that by choosing " su¢ ciently small and o⁄ering the menu ￿M0
i such that
Im(￿M0
i ) = f(q0
i(￿);t0
i(￿)) : ￿ 2 ￿g, irrespective of the agent￿ s continuation equilibrium ￿M
A , Pi can
guarantee herself a payo⁄ arbitrarily close to ￿ Ui and hence has pro￿table deviation.
Next suppose that f￿0 [ g(￿0)g \ z(￿) 6= ?: This means that there exists a pair ￿;￿0 with
￿ 2 ￿0 and ￿0 2 z(￿) such that either ￿0 2 ￿0 or there exists another type ￿00 2 ￿0 such that
(qi(￿00);ti(￿00)) = (qi(￿0);ti(￿0)) which in turn implies that ￿00 2 z(￿): Without loss, thus assume the
former case. The schedules q0
i(￿) and t0
i(￿) constructed above then leave type ￿ indi⁄erent between
the contract (q0
i(￿);t0
i(￿)) designed for him and the contract (q0
i(￿0);t0
i(￿0)) designed for type ￿0: The
fact that the agent￿ s payo⁄￿qi+v￿
i (￿;qi)￿v￿
i (￿;0) has the strict increasing-di⁄erence property with
respect to (￿;qi) however guarantees that ￿ = 2 z(￿0) : that is, if type ￿ is willing to take type ￿0￿ s
contract, then it cannot be that type ￿0 is also willing to swap with type ￿: The same property also
implies that if ￿00 2 z(￿0), with ￿00 6= ￿; then necessarily ￿ = 2 z(￿00): That is, if type ￿ is indi⁄erent
between the contract designed for him and the contract designed for type ￿0 and if, at the same
time, type ￿0 is indi⁄erent between the contract designed for him and that designed for type ￿00;
then it cannot be that type ￿00 is also indi⁄erent between the contract designed for him and that
designed for type ￿: These properties in turn guarantee that the procedure that permits one to
transform the schedules qi(￿) and ti(￿) into the schedules q0
i(￿) and t0
i(￿) can be iterated (without
cycling) till no type is any longer indi⁄erent.
We conclude that if there exists a pair of schedules qi(￿) and ti(￿) that solve the program in
condition (c) in the proposition and yield Pi a payo⁄ ￿ Ui > U￿
i ; then irrespective of how one speci￿es
the agent￿ s continuation equilibrium, Pi necessarily has a pro￿table deviation. This in turn proves
that (c) is necessary.









f(￿) [q1 + q2]g:
The solution to this program is given by45







8￿, i = 1;2:
To prove the result, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose there exists a pair of tari⁄s that
sustains the collusive schedules as an equilibrium in which the agent￿ s strategy is Markov. Using the
result of Proposition 1, there then exists a pair of incentive-compatible mechanisms ￿r
i = (~ qi(￿);~ ti(￿))
that satis￿es conditions (a) and (b) in Proposition 1 with q￿
i (￿) = qc(￿); i = 1;2. The fact that it is
optimal for each ￿ to select the quantity qc(￿) and pay ~ ti(m(￿)) to each principal implies that, for
i = 1;2;





~ q1(~ ￿1) + ~ q2(~ ￿2)
i





￿~ qi(~ ￿i) + v￿





￿~ qi(~ ￿i) + v￿
i (￿; ~ qi(~ ￿i)) ￿ ~ ti(~ ￿i)
o
where all equalities follow directly from the fact that the mechanisms ￿r
i = (~ qi(￿);~ ti(￿)) are incentive-
compatible and satisfy conditions (a) and (b) in Proposition 1. Because for any ￿ 2 ￿ and
any message ~ ￿i 2 [mi(￿);mi(￿ ￿)]; the marginal valuation ￿ + ￿~ qi(~ ￿i) 2 [mj(￿);mj(￿ ￿)] and be-
cause ~ qj(￿) is continuous over [mj(￿);mj(￿ ￿)]; there exists a constant Mi > 0 such that, for any
q 2 [~ qj(mj(￿)); ~ qj(mj(￿ ￿))] = [qc(￿);qc(￿ ￿)]; the function wi(￿;q) : ￿ ! R de￿ned by wi(￿;q) ￿
￿q + v￿
i (￿;q) is Mi-Lipschitz continuous and di⁄erentiable and its derivative satis￿es
@wi(￿;q)
@￿
= q + ~ qj(￿ + ￿q) ￿ 2 ￿ Qi:
Using the envelope theorem, we then have that, if the mechanisms ￿r
1 and ￿r
2 satisfy conditions (a)
and (b), then the functions ~ ti(￿) must satisfy




[qc(s) + ~ qj(s + ￿qc(s))]ds ￿ ^ Ki
= ￿qc(￿) + [v￿




[qc(s) + ~ qj(s + ￿qc(s)) ￿ ~ qj(s)]ds ￿ Ki
for some ^ Ki;Ki ￿ 0, where the second equality comes from the fact that v￿
i (￿;0) =
R ￿
min ~ ￿i ~ qj(s)ds+
~ Kj =
R ￿
￿ ~ qj(s)ds+ ~ Kj: This in turn implies that the equilibrium payo⁄U￿
i for each Pi can be written
45For simplicity, we assume that the solution is interior: q







Now take an interval
￿
￿0;￿00￿
￿ [￿;￿ ￿] and, for any ￿ 2
￿
￿0;￿00￿
, let Q(￿) ￿ [qc(￿) ￿ ";qc(￿) + "];
where " > 0 is chosen so that, for any ￿ 2
￿
￿0;￿00￿
and any q 2 Q(￿); (￿ +￿q) 2 [m(￿);m(￿)]: Next,
note that, for any ￿ 2
￿
￿0;￿00￿


















@~ ￿ < 0
where the inequality follows from the de￿nition of qc(￿) and from the fact that ~ qj(￿) is strictly
increasing over [m(￿);m(￿ ￿)]: This means that there exists a non-decreasing schedule qi : ￿ ! Q






Condition (12) then implies that Pi has a pro￿table deviation, which contradicts the assumption
that ~ ￿
r
1 and ~ ￿
r
2 satisfy condition (c) in the proposition. We conclude that, when the agent￿ s behavior
is Markov, there exists no pair of tari⁄s that support the collusive schedules as an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let q￿(￿) be the solution to the di⁄erential equation in (9) and ~ q(￿)
the schedule given in (9). Using the result in Proposition 1, it su¢ ces to show that there exists a
scalar ~ K ￿ 0 such that the pair of schedules ~ qi(￿) = ~ q(￿); i = 1;2; along with the pair of schedules
~ ti(￿) = ~ t(￿), i = 1;2; with ~ t(￿) de￿ned by
~ t(~ ￿) = ~ ￿~ q(~ ￿) ￿
Z ~ ￿
min ~ ￿
~ q(s)ds ￿ ~ K 8~ ￿ 2 ~ ￿
satisfy conditions (a)-(c) in Proposition 1. That these schedules satisfy condition (a) is immediate.
Thus consider (b). Fix ￿r￿
j = (~ q(￿);~ t(￿)). Note that, for any q 2 Q; the function
gi(￿;q) ￿ ￿q + v￿
i (￿;q) ￿ v￿




is equi-Lipschitz continuous in ￿, has the strict increasing di⁄erence property, and satis￿es the
"convex-kink" condition of Assumption 1 in Ely (2001). Theorem 2 in Milgrom and Segal (2002)
together with Theorem 2 in Ely (2001) then imply that, given ￿r￿
j ; the schedules (qi(￿);ti(￿)) satisfy
the (IC) and (IR) constraints of condition (c) in Proposition 1 if and only if qi(￿) is nondecreasing
and ti : ￿ ! R is such that, for any ￿ 2 ￿;
ti(￿) = ￿qi(￿) + [v￿




[qi(s) + ~ q(s + ￿qi(s)) ￿ ~ q(s)]ds ￿ K0
i (13)
39for some K0
i ￿ 0: Now let t￿(￿) be the schedule that is obtained from (13) letting qi(￿) = q￿(￿) and
setting K0
i = 0: By construction, it then follows that each type ￿ prefers the allocation
(q￿(￿);t￿(￿); ~ q(m(￿));~ t(m(￿))) = (q￿(￿);t￿(￿);q￿(￿);~ t(m(￿)))









)) : ~ ￿
0
2 ~ ￿g [ (0;0): This also means that the pair of schedules q0 : [m(￿);m(￿ ￿)] ￿! Q
and t0 : [m(￿);m(￿ ￿)] ￿! R given by
q0(~ ￿) = q￿(m￿1(~ ￿)) and t0(~ ￿) = t￿(m￿1(~ ￿))
are incentive-compatible over [m(￿);m(￿ ￿)]: But this means that the schedule t0(￿) can also be written
as




Clearly, if Pj o⁄ers the mechanism ￿r￿
j = (~ q(￿);~ t(￿)) and Pi o⁄ers the schedules (q0(￿);t0(￿)); it
is optimal for each ￿ to participate and report m(￿) to each principal. Because for each ~ ￿ 2
[m(￿);m(￿ ￿)]; q0(~ ￿) = ~ q(~ ￿) and because ~ q(~ ￿) = 0 for any ~ ￿ < m(￿); we then have that, for any
~ ￿ 2 [m(￿);m(￿ ￿)];
t0(~ ￿) = ~ t(~ ￿) + ~ K:
Furthermore, because for any ~ ￿ > m(￿ ￿);
￿




~ q(m(￿ ￿));~ t(m(￿ ￿))
￿
= (q0(￿ ￿);t0(￿ ￿)); it is
immediate from the aforementioned results that when both principals o⁄er the mechanism ￿r￿
i =
(~ q(￿);~ t(￿)) i = 1;2; with ~ K = 0; each type ￿ ￿nds it optimal to participate in both mechanisms and
report m(￿) to each principal thus obtaining the equilibrium quantity q￿(￿). In other words, the
pair of mechanisms ￿r￿
i = (~ q(￿);~ t(￿)); i = 1;2; with ~ K = 0; satis￿es conditions (a) and (b) in the
proposition.
It remains to show that, condition (c) also holds. Recall that, given ￿r￿
j = (~ q(￿);~ t(￿)); a pair of
schedules (qi(￿);ti(￿)) satis￿es the (IC) and (IR) constraints of Proposition 1 if and only if qi(￿) is
nondecreasing and ti(￿) is as in (13). This means that the program of condition (c) is equivalent to
that in (6). Because, for any ￿ 2 int(￿); the function h(￿;￿) is maximized at q = q￿(￿); the solution
to this program is the function q￿(￿) along with Ki = 0. To see this, note that the fact that q￿(￿)













Together with the fact that h(￿;￿) is quasiconcave then gives the result.
Equilibria in the menu auction game of Section 4.2. Consider the menu auction
environment of Section 4.2 and assume principals are restricted to make take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers
ai : E ! [0;1].
40Consider ￿rst pure-strategy equilibria in which e1 is selected. In any such equilibrium, nec-
essarily a￿
1(￿) is such that a￿
1(e1) = 1; otherwise P1 could deviate and o⁄er a contract a1(￿) such
that a1(e1) = a1(e2) = 1; ensuring that A does not ￿nd it pro￿table to switch to e = e2, and
obtaining a higher payo⁄. But then necessarily a￿
2(￿) must be such that a￿
2(e1) = 1; otherwise P2
could increase a2(e1) ensuring A does not ￿nd it pro￿table to change action, and obtaining a higher
payo⁄. We conclude that in any equilibrium in which e1 is selected, a￿
i(e1) = 1; i = 1;2: That such
an equilibrium exists follows from the fact that it can be sustained, for example, by the following
contracts a￿
i(e) = 1; i = 1;2; e = e1;e2:
Next, consider equilibria in which e2 is selected. In these equilibria, necessarily a￿
1(e2) = 1=2:
To see this, ￿rst suppose that a￿
1(e2) < 1=2: The agent￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ is then strictly higher
than 1: But then, necessarily a￿
2(e2) = 1; otherwise P2 could deviate and o⁄er a contract such that
a2(e2) = 1 and a2(e1) = 0 which ensures that A does not bene￿t from switching to e = e1 and gives
P2 a strictly higher payo⁄. This means that P1￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ is strictly less than ￿1=2: But
then P1 has a pro￿table deviation that consists in setting a1(e) = 1 for any e; which induces A to
switch to e1, raising P1￿ s payo⁄ to at least ￿1=2:
Next, suppose that a￿
1(e2) > 1=2: Then necessarily a￿
2(e2) = 1; this follows from the fact that,
given e2, both the agent￿ s and P2￿ s payo⁄s are increasing in a2: But then necessarily a￿
1(e2) = 1;
for otherwise P1 would have a pro￿table deviation that consists in setting a1(e1) = a1(e2) = 1 thus
inducing A to change action. But this means that P1￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ is exactly equal to ￿1=2:
This in turn also implies that necessarily a￿
2(e1) = 1; for otherwise P1 would again have a pro￿table
deviation by setting a1(e1) = a1(e2) = 1 which would induce A to switch to e = e1: Furthermore,
because A￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ is 1=2; this also means that necessarily a￿
1(e1) ￿ 1=4; else A would
bene￿t from deviating to e = e1: But then P2 has a pro￿table deviation that consists in o⁄ering a
contract such that a2(e1) = 0 and a2(e2) = 1 which induces the agent to switch to e = e1:
Thus necessarily a￿
1(e2) = 1=2: Now, because P1 can guarantee herself at least ￿1=2 by o⁄ering
a contract such that a1(e1) = a1(e2) = 1 and inducing A to select e = e1; it must be that
a￿
2(e2) ￿ 1=2: Furthermore, for any a2(e2) < 1=2, given e2, both the agent￿ s and P1￿ s payo⁄ are
strictly decreasing in a1; this implies that there cannot exist equilibria in which a2(e2) < 1=2:
Hence, in any equilibrium in which e2 is selected, necessarily a￿
1(e2) = a￿
2(e2) = 1=2: To see that
such an equilibrium exists, it then su¢ ces to note that it can be sustained, for example, by the
following contracts: a￿
1(e1) = a￿
1(e2) = 1=2, a￿
2(e1) = 1 and a￿
2(e2) = 1=2: Given the contract o⁄ered
by P2; P1 clearly does not have pro￿table deviations￿ this is true whatever the agent￿ s strategy.
Furthermore, given the contract o⁄ered by P1; the agent is indi⁄erent about e￿ this is true whatever
the contract o⁄ered by P2: It follows that any deviation by P2 can be punished by having the agent
switching to e = e1: We conclude that an equilibrium that sustains (e￿
2;a￿
1 = a￿
2 = 1=2) exists.
Proof of Theorem 5.
41The proof is in two parts. Part 1 proves that if there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium ￿M￿
of ￿M that implements the SCF ￿; there also exists a truthful pure-strategy equilibrium ￿r￿ of ^ ￿r
that implements the same outcomes. Part 2 proves that any SCF ￿ that can be sustained as an
equilibrium of ^ ￿r can also be sustained as an equilibrium of ￿M:
Part 1. Let ￿M￿ and ￿M￿
A denote respectively the equilibrium menus and the continuation
equilibrium that support ￿ in ￿M. Then, for any i; let ￿￿
i(￿) denote the decision that A takes in
equilibrium with Pi when his type is ￿:
As a preliminary step, we prove the following result.
Lemma 1 Suppose the SCF ￿ can be sustained as a pure-strategy equilibrium of ￿M: Then it can
also be sustained as a pure-strategy equilibrium in which the agent￿ s strategy satis￿es the following
property. For any k 2 N; ￿ 2 ￿ and ￿k 2 Dk, there exists a unique ￿￿k(￿;￿k) 2 D￿k such that
A always selects ￿￿k(￿;￿k) with all principals other than k when Pk deviates from the equilibrium
menu, the agent￿ s type is ￿, the decision A selects with Pk is ￿k, and any principal Pi, i 6= k, o⁄ered
the equilibrium menu.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let ~ ￿
M
and ~ ￿M
A denote respectively the equilibrium menus and the
continuation equilibrium that support ￿ in ￿M. Take any k 2 N and for any (￿;￿k) 2 ￿ ￿ Dk let
￿￿k(￿;￿k) be any pro￿le of decisions such that



















j ): Now consider the following pure-strategy pro￿le￿ ￿M: For any i 2 N;
￿ ￿M
i is the pure strategy that prescribes that Pi o⁄ers the same menu ~ ￿
M
i as under ~ ￿M. The
continuation equilibrium ￿ ￿M
A is such that, when either ￿M
i = ~ ￿
M




i gj > 1, then ￿ ￿M
A (￿;￿M) = ~ ￿M
A (￿;￿M); for any ￿: When instead ￿M is such that ￿M
i = ~ ￿
M
i for
all i 6= k; while ￿M
k 6= ~ ￿
M
i for some k 2 N, then each type ￿ selects a pro￿le of decisions (￿k;￿￿k)
such that ￿k is the same decision that, given the menus (~ ￿
M
￿k;￿M
k ); type ￿ would have selected with
Pk according to the original strategy ~ ￿M
A whereas ￿￿k = ￿￿k(￿;￿k); as de￿ned in (15). Given any
pro￿le of contracts y selected by the lotteries (￿k;￿￿k); the e⁄ort the agent selects is then ￿k(￿;y)
as de￿ned in (2).
It is immediate that the behavior prescribed by the strategy ￿ ￿M
A is sequentially rational for
the agent. Furthermore, given ￿ ￿M
A ; a principal Pi who expects all other principals to o⁄er the
equilibrium menus ~ ￿
M
￿i cannot do better than o⁄ering the equilibrium menu ~ ￿
M
i . We conclude that
￿ ￿M is a pure-strategy equilibrium of ￿M that sustains the same SCF as ~ ￿M.
42Hence, without loss, assume ￿M￿ satis￿es the property of Lemma 1. For any i;k 2 N with
k 6= i; and for any (￿;￿k) 2 ￿ ￿ Dk; let ￿i(￿;￿k) denote the unique decision that A selects with Pi
when his type is ￿; the decision taken with Pk is ￿k, and the menus o⁄ered are ￿M
j = ￿M￿
j for all
j 6= k; and ￿M
k 6= ￿M￿
k :
Next, consider the following strategy pro￿le ^ ￿r￿ for ^ ￿r: Each principal o⁄ers a direct mechanism
^ ￿
r￿








i(￿) if k = 0 and ￿￿i = ￿￿
￿i(￿)
￿i(￿;￿k) if k 6= 0 and ￿￿i is such that ￿j = ￿j(￿;￿k) for all j 6= i;k
￿i 2 argmax￿0
i2Im(￿M￿
i ) V (￿￿i;￿0
i;￿) in all other cases.
By construction, ^ ￿
r￿
i is incentive compatible. Now consider the following strategy ^ ￿r￿
A for the agent
in ^ ￿r:
(i) Given the equilibrium mechanisms ^ ￿
r￿
; each type ￿ reports a message ^ mr
i = (￿;￿￿
￿i(￿);0) to
each Pi: Given any pro￿le of contracts y selected by the lotteries ￿￿(￿), the agent then mixes over E
with the same distribution he would have used in ￿M given (￿;￿M￿;m￿(￿);y) where m￿(￿) ￿ ￿￿(￿)
are the equilibrium messages that type ￿ would have sent in ￿M given the equilibrium menus ￿M￿.
(ii) Given any pro￿le of mechanisms ^ ￿
r
such that ^ ￿
r
i = ^ ￿
r￿
i for all i 6= k; while ^ ￿
r
k 6= ^ ￿
r￿
k for
some k 2 N; let ￿k denote the decision that type ￿ would have induced with Pk in ￿M had the
menus o⁄ered been ￿M = (￿M￿
￿k ;￿M
k ) where ￿M
k is the menu whose image Im(￿M




A then prescribes that type ￿ reports to Pk any message mr
k such that ￿r
k(mr
k) = ￿k and
then reports to any other principal Pi, i 6= k, the message ^ mr
i = (￿;￿￿i;k), with
￿￿i = (￿k;(￿j(￿;￿k))j6=i;k):
Given any contracts y selected by the lotteries ￿ = (￿k;￿j(￿;￿k)j6=k), A then selects e⁄ort ￿k(￿;y);
as de￿ned in (2).
(iii) Finally, for any pro￿le of mechanisms ^ ￿
r
such that the jfi 2 N : ^ ￿
r
i 6= ^ ￿
r￿
i gj > 1, simply
let ^ ￿r
A(￿;￿r) be any strategy that is sequentially optimal for A given (￿; ^ ￿
r
).
The behavior prescribed by the strategy ^ ￿r￿
A is clearly a continuation equilibrium. Furthermore,
given ^ ￿r￿
A , any principal Pi who expects all other principals to o⁄er the equilibrium mechanisms
^ ￿
r￿
￿i cannot do better than o⁄ering the equilibrium mechanism ^ ￿
r￿
i ; for any i 2 N: We conclude
that the strategy pro￿le ^ ￿r￿ in which each Pi o⁄ers the mechanism ^ ￿
r￿
i and A follows the strategy
^ ￿￿
A is a truthful pure-strategy equilibrium of ^ ￿r and sustains the same SCF ￿ as ￿M￿ in ￿M:
Part 2. We now prove that if there exists an equilibrium ^ ￿r of ^ ￿r that sustains the SCF
￿, then there also exists an equilibrium ￿M￿ of ￿M that sustains the same SCF. For any i 2 N
and any ￿M
i 2 ￿M
i ; let ^ ￿r
i(￿M
i ) ￿ f^ ￿
r
i 2 ￿r
i : Im(^ ￿
r
i) = Im(￿M
i )g denote the set of revelation
mechanisms with the same image as ￿M
i . The proof then follows from the same steps as in the
43proof of Part 2 in Theorem 2 replacing the mappings ￿r
i(￿) with the mappings ^ ￿r
i(￿) and with the
following adjustment for Case 2. For any ￿M such that there exists a j 2 N such that ^ ￿r
i(￿M
i ) 6= ?
for all i 6= j while ^ ￿r
j(￿M
j ) = ?, let ^ ￿
r
j be any arbitrary revelation mechanism such that
^ ￿
r
j(￿;￿￿j;k) 2 arg max
￿j2Im(￿M
j )
V (￿j;￿￿j;￿) 8(￿;￿￿j;k) 2 ￿ ￿ D￿j ￿ N￿j:
For any ￿ 2 ￿; the strategy ￿M￿
A (￿;￿M) then induces the same distribution over outcomes as the
strategy ^ ￿r￿
A given ^ ￿
r
j and given ^ ￿
r






i ) in the sense of (11).
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Proof of Theorem 6
The proof is in 2 parts.1 Part 1 proves that for any equilibrium ￿M of ￿M; there exists an
equilibrium ~ ￿r of ~ ￿r that implements the same outcomes. Part 2 proves the converse.
Part 1. Let Qi be a generic partition of ￿M
i and denote by Qi 2 Qi a generic element of
Qi: Consider now a partition-game ￿Q in which each Pi chooses an element of Qi, then A selects
a pro￿le of menus ￿M = (￿M
1 ;:::;￿M
n ) one from each Qi, chooses the lotteries ￿ and given the
contracts y determined by the lotteries ￿, he ￿nally chooses e⁄ort e 2 E.
The proof of part 1 is in two steps. Step 1 identi￿es a collection of partitions Q = (Qi)i2N such
that the agent￿ s payo⁄ is the same for any pair of menus ￿M
i ;￿M0
i 2 Qi; i = 1;:::;n: It then shows
that, for any ￿M 2 E(￿M) there exists a ￿ ￿ 2 E(￿Q) which implements the same outcomes. Step 2
uses the equilibrium ￿ ￿ of ￿Q constructed in Step 1 to prove existence of a truthful equilibrium ~ ￿r
of ~ ￿r which also supports the same outcomes as ￿M.
Step 1. Take a generic collection of partitions Q =(Qi)i2N; one for each ￿M
i , i = 1;:::;n with
Qi consisting of measurable sets.2 Consider the following strategy pro￿le ￿ ￿ for the partition game
￿Q: For any Pi; let ￿ ￿i 2 ￿(Qi) be the distribution over Qi induced by the equilibrium strategy ￿M
i
of ￿M: That is, for any subset Ri of Qi whose union is measurable,




Next consider the agent. For any Q = (Q1;:::;Qn) 2
Q
i2N




using the distribution ￿ ￿A(￿jQ) ￿ ￿M
1 (￿jQ1) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿M
n (￿jQn), where for each Qi; ￿M
i (￿jQi) is the
1The notation follows that in the paper.
2In the sequel, we assume that any set of mechanisms ￿
M
i is a Polish space and whenever we talk about measur-
ability, we mean with respect to the Borel ￿-algebra ￿ on ￿
M
i :
1regular conditional distribution over ￿M
i that is obtained from the equilibrium strategy ￿M
i of Pi
conditioning on ￿M
i 2 Qi:3 After selecting the menus ￿M, A follows the same behavior prescribed
by the strategy ￿M
A for ￿M:
Now, ￿x the agent￿ s strategy ~ ￿A as described above. It is immediate that, whatever the
partitions Q, the strategies (￿ ￿i)i2N constitute an equilibrium for the game ￿Q(￿ ￿A) among the
principals.
In what follows, we identify a collection of partitions Q that make ￿ ￿A sequentially optimal for







i ) = h￿(￿￿i;￿M0
i ) 8(￿;￿￿i);
where, for any mechanism ￿i, h￿(￿￿i;￿i) ￿ argmax￿i2Im(￿i) V (￿i;￿￿i;￿):
Now, let Q = (Qi)i2N be the collection of partitions generated by the equivalence relations ￿i,
i = 1;:::;n: It is immediate that, in the partition game ￿Q; ￿ ￿A is sequentially optimal for A. We
conclude that for any ￿M 2 E(￿M) there exists a ￿ ￿ 2 E(￿Q) which implements the same outcomes
as ￿M.
Step 2. We next prove that starting from ￿ ￿; one can construct a truthful equilibrium ~ ￿r for ~ ￿r
that also implements the same outcomes as ￿M in ￿M. For any i 2 N and Qi 2 Qi, let h￿(￿￿i;Qi) ￿
h￿(￿￿i;￿M
i ) for some ￿M
i 2 Qi: Since for any two menus ￿M
i ;￿M0
i 2 Qi; h￿(￿￿i;￿M
i ) = h￿(￿￿i;￿M0
i )







denote the revelation mechanism given by
~ ￿r
i(￿;￿￿i) = h￿(￿￿i;Qi) 8(￿;￿￿i) 2 ￿ ￿ D￿i: (1)
For any set of mechanisms B ￿ ~ ￿r





2 Bg denote the set of
corresponding cells in Qi. The strategy ~ ￿r
i 2 ￿(~ ￿r
i) for Pi is given by
~ ￿r
i(B) = ￿ ￿i(Qi(B)) 8B ￿ ~ ￿r
i:




Qi denote the pro￿le of cells in ￿Q such that, for any i 2 N; the cell Qi(~ ￿r
i) is such that
h￿(￿￿i;Qi) = ~ ￿r
i(￿￿i;￿) for any (￿;￿￿i) 2 ￿ ￿ D￿i: Now, let ~ ￿r
A be any truthful strategy that
implements the same distribution over A ￿ E as ￿ ￿A given Q(￿r): Precisely, let ￿￿A : ￿ ￿ ￿ !
￿(A ￿ E) denote the distribution over outcomes induced by ￿A in ￿: Then ~ ￿r
A is any truthful
strategy such that, for any (￿; ~ ￿r) 2 ￿ ￿ ~ ￿r;
￿~ ￿r
















3Assuming that each ￿
M
i is a Polish space endowed with the Borel ￿-algebra ￿i, the existence of such a conditional
probability measure follows from Theorem 10.2.2 in Dudley (2002, p. 345).
2The strategy ~ ￿r
A is clearly optimal for A: Furthermore, given ~ ￿r
A; the strategy pro￿le (~ ￿r
i)i2N
is an equilibrium for the game among the principals. We conclude that ~ ￿r = (~ ￿r
A;(~ ￿r
i)i2N) is an
equilibrium for ~ ￿r and sustains the same outcomes as ￿M in ￿M.
Part 2. We now prove the converse: Given an equilibrium ~ ￿r of ~ ￿r that sustains the SCF ￿,
there exists an equilibrium ￿M of ￿M that sustains the same SCF.
For any i 2 N, let ￿i : ~ ￿r
i ! ￿M
i denote the injective mapping de￿ned by the relation
Im(￿i(~ ￿r
i)) = Im(~ ￿r
i) 8~ ￿r




i denote the range of ￿i(￿): For any ￿M
i 2 ￿i(~ ￿r
i); then let ￿￿1
i (￿M
i ) denote the
unique revelation mechanism such that Im(~ ￿r
i) = Im(￿M
i ):
Now consider the following strategy for the agent in ￿M. For any ￿M such that, for all i 2 N,
￿M
i 2 ￿i(~ ￿r
i); let ￿M
A be such that ￿￿M
A (￿;￿M) = ￿~ ￿r




If instead ￿M is such that ￿M
j 2 ￿j(~ ￿r
j) for all j 6= i; while for i; ￿M
i = 2 ￿i(~ ￿r
i); then let ￿M
A be such
that ￿￿M




j )j6=i) where ~ ￿r
i is any revelation mechanism that satis￿es
~ ￿r
i (￿;￿￿i) = h￿(￿￿i;￿M
i ) 8(￿;￿￿i) 2 ￿ ￿ D￿i:
Finally, for any ￿M such that jfj 2 N : ￿M
j = 2 ￿j(~ ￿r
j)gj > 1, simply let ￿M
A be any rational response
for the agent given (￿;￿M). It is immediate that the strategy ￿M
A constitutes a continuation
equilibrium for ￿M.
Now consider the following strategy pro￿le for the principals For any i 2 N, let ￿M
i = ￿i(~ ￿r
i);
where ￿i(~ ￿r
i) denotes the randomization over ￿M
i obtained from the strategy ~ ￿r
i using the mapping
￿i: Formally, for any measurable set B ￿ ￿M
i ; ￿M
i (B) = ~ ￿r
i(f~ ￿r
i : ￿i(~ ￿r
i) 2 Bg): It is straight
forward to see that any principal Pi who expects the agent to follow the strategy ￿M
A and any
other principal Pj to follow the strategy ￿M
j = ￿j(~ ￿r
j) cannot do better than following the strategy
￿M
i = ￿i(~ ￿r
i): We conclude that ￿M is an equilibrium of ￿M and sustains the same SCF ￿ as ~ ￿r in
~ ￿r:
3